

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI

by

Pat L. Williams

December 1995

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
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
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most important factors necessary for democratic transition in Haiti, and to assess the U.S. role in promoting democracy. This thesis provides an in-depth review of theoretical literature on democratization. The thesis then reviews Haitian history, with a focus on the legacies that have significant implications for the democratization of Haiti. This thesis concludes that the United States' support of democracy in Haiti is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing democracy in that country. The United States cannot compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings, but it can seek to affect the two most important internal factors for Haiti's democratization: civil-military relations and political institutions. U.S. support for democracy in Haiti will only succeed if the Haitian civilian government exercises control over the military, and if Haiti's political institutions are efficient and functioning properly. Finally, the thesis (a) provides recommendations for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Haiti, (b) argues that the Haitian case can only be generalized in narrow instances, and (c) raises issues for future research.

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Pat L. Williams

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is substantial debate on the role and effectiveness of external actors versus internal actors in the promotion of democracy. With the end of the cold war, the United States has become increasingly supportive of democratic movements and institutions throughout the world. This thesis argues that without the support of the United States, hopes for democratization in Haiti would remain shattered. Because of Haiti's lack of experience with democracy, it needs such external support and assistance, which provides the opportunity for Haiti to begin the process of democratization.

Chapter II reviews the literature on democratization and the various factors that affect democratization, including: historical factors, political culture, political leadership, political institutions, state structure and strength, the military, civil society and associational life, inequality, class and other cleavages, socioeconomic development, economic policies and performance, and international factors. This thesis has narrowed the variables, and assesses the impact of three key variables on Haiti's democratic transition. The first two are primarily internal variables, while the third is external: 1) the nature of civil-military relations; 2) the strength of key political institutions, such as political parties, legislature, and judiciary; and 3) the role of external actors, specifically the United States. The thesis applies these three factors to Haiti in an effort to assess this nation's prospects for a successful transition to democracy.

Chapter III reviews Haitian history, with a focus on legacies such as colonialism; the 1915 to 1934 U.S. intervention and occupation; a politicized military; and the 1957 - 1986 Duvalier dictatorships. It then provides an analysis of Haitian history by applying the three variables, concluding that Haitian polity is characterized by revolutionary violence, isolationism by American

and European powers, and extreme poverty. Moreover, there has been no tradition of a proper balance in civil-military relations, nor is there a foundation upon which to build viable institutions. After the first U.S. occupation (1915-1934), not only was Haiti nowhere near a democracy, the country was left with a powerful and politicized military, the Garde d'Haiti.

Chapter IV examines democratization efforts in Haiti from the end of the Jean-Claude Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 to the 1994/1995 attempt to transition to democracy with the assistance of external actors like the United States and the United Nations. The 1990 presidential election was the first free and fair election since Haiti's 1804 independence from France. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was democratically elected December 16, 1990 by 67 percent of Haitian voters, and took office February 7, 1991. The validity of the election was upheld by the international community. It was hoped that the election would end the long periods of dictatorship and political instability, marking the beginning of democratic, economic, and social progress. However, hopes for a democratic Haiti were shattered with the September 30, 1991 military coup d'etat. After three years of diplomacy and sanctions, Haiti was offered a new beginning, which came via U.S.-led intervention, albeit peaceful. Operation Uphold Democracy was launched September 19, 1994 with the arrival of 20,000 U.S. troops, and the subsequent return of the exiled Aristide. Chapter IV then applies the three major variables affecting democratization, concluding that Haiti's struggle for democracy is just beginning with the assistance and opportunity that Operation Uphold Democracy provides.

Chapter V assesses U.S. policy options and makes recommendations. The eventual consolidation of democracy in Haiti (or lack thereof) could have implications for U.S. policy if the United States seeks democratization in other countries with limited democratic tradition, such as

post-Castro Cuba; and if there is a recurrence of Haitian migration to the United States, or a recurrence of human rights abuses.

Chapter VI provides conclusions, considers whether the Haitian case can be generalized, and raises issues for future research. There are three possible conclusions that can be reached in the thesis concerning the potential impact of the United States on the transition to democracy in Haiti: (a) the U.S. support is a necessary and sufficient condition for democratization in Haiti; (b) the U.S. support is necessary but not sufficient; and (c) the U.S. support is not necessary or sufficient. This thesis supports the second explanation. By and large, Haiti must democratize "from within." With the 1994 U.S.-led intervention, can the United States compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings? No, but the United States can seek to affect (1) civil-military relations, and (2) the viability of political institutions. For example, despite allegations of irregularities, the internationally monitored elections held in June and September 1995 constitute a positive step in Haiti's efforts to transition to democracy. While U.S. assistance is vital, the United States cannot export democracy without Haiti's readiness for the transition.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1978, only two functioning democracies existed in South America. In 1995, if Haiti makes the successful transition to democracy, thereby becoming a part of the "third wave" democratization phenomenon, only Cuba will remain a clear dictatorship in the Americas. By "third wave", Samuel P. Huntington refers to the, across the globe, transition of some thirty countries from nondemocratic to democratic political systems between 1974 and 1990.

The tiny island nation of Haiti has received considerable international attention since September 30, 1991, when the Haitian military violently overthrew Haiti's first democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Elected December 16, 1990, Aristide won the first free and fair presidential election since Haiti's independence in 1804. Despite the rebirth of hopes for democracy in Haiti raised by the election of Aristide, seven months after assuming the presidency, President Aristide was overthrown and exiled to the United States.

Interrupted from 1991 to 1994 by the Haitian military, Haiti is once again attempting to make the transition to democracy. Backed by the United States, President Aristide returned to the Haitian presidency on October 15, 1994. That return elicited much euphoria from the Haitian masses. On October 15, 1995, Haiti celebrated the first anniversary of Aristide's return from his three-year exile. Amid presidential messages of non-vengeance and reconciliation, hopes for democracy are once again soaring, as they soared in 1990 and 1991. Immediate questions are: 1) Is democracy in Haiti possible?; 2) If so, by what methods will democracy come about?; and 3) What are the critical factors for democracy? Moreover, just how important is the role of the United States?

A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most important factors necessary for democratic transition in Haiti, and to assess the U.S. role in promoting democracy. In Haiti's case, the thesis will isolate and assess three pivotal variables. The first two are primarily internal variables: the nature of civil-military relations; and the strength of *key* political institutions, such as the political party system, the legislature, and the judiciary. The third is an external variable: the role of external actors, and more specifically, the United States.

Democracy can be brought about through various means. In "Paths toward Redemocratization," Alfred Stepan posits eight plausible paths, one of which is externally monitored installation. He cites Japan and Germany as the purest cases of such foreign imposition.¹ In his examination of third wave democratization, Huntington also asserts that countries make the transition to democracy in different ways, one of which is a result of foreign invasion and imposition. According to Huntington, until 1991, Panama and Grenada were the only cases of third wave democratization via foreign invasion, namely, U.S. intervention.² Huntington was writing prior to the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti. Thus, Haiti would presumably constitute a third case of democratic transition via foreign intervention.

This thesis is important for various reasons. In terms of U.S. policy, the Haitian case is important for the United States because of (a) the continuing presence of 2,500 U.S. military

¹Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 71.

²Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 164.

personnel in Haiti; (b) Haiti's proximity to the United States; and (c) recurrent U.S. involvement in Haiti. Furthermore, if the attempt by the United States to restore democracy fails, then the United States may be drawn into Haitian affairs again, especially if that failure leads to Haitian migration to the United States, or a recurrence of human rights abuses. Also, the eventual consolidation of democracy in Haiti (or lack thereof) could have implications for U.S. policy if the United States seeks democratization in other countries with limited democratic tradition, such as Cuba. In terms of theory, external and internal factors have been posited as affecting a country's transition to democracy, with most of the literature emphasizing internal variables. Nevertheless, the external vs. internal debate is an open one, and the Haitian case could lead to a reassessment of the relative importance of each.

This thesis addresses a number of related issues, such as: What are the chances that the United States will succeed in laying the foundation for the institutions required for democratization? The question then becomes, can democracy be imposed through a-democratic means? What conditions need to exist in order to establish a democracy in a non-democratic state? How does one build conditions favorable to democratic transition? If the United States seeks to promote democracy, what is more effective: unilateralism or multilateralism?

B. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will provide an in-depth review of theoretical literature on democratization. The thesis then reviews Haitian history, with a focus on the legacies that have significant implications for the democratization of Haiti. Following the history chapter, the thesis applies the three pivotal variables to Haiti, to determine the salience and effects of each on Haiti's democratization. The three variables were derived from the literature review. Various competing variables were narrowed

to the three posited herein as most applicable to Haiti. The thesis will next analyze politics in Haiti from the end of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986 to the 1994 U.S.-led intervention, assessing the situation in Haiti for a one year period, from September 1994 to September 1995. Information derived from various interviews will add insight to the Haitian case.

The dependent variable of this thesis is democracy. The independent variables are the three factors this thesis posits as having the most significant effect on the prospects for developing and maintaining a democratic government. This thesis will analyze the effect of these factors on democracy, in an effort to assess Haiti's prospects for a successful transition to democracy.

This thesis explores the aspects of one case (Haiti) against the background of broadly comparative democratization literature. The case is not necessarily unique, as evidenced by U.S. intervention in Panama and Grenada. In 1983, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States invaded Grenada to protect 1,100 Americans, to oust pro-Cuban elements, and to promote democracy. U.S. troops did not leave before the pro-Castro government had been replaced. In 1989, President George Bush ordered the invasion of Panama in response to harassment of Americans there. In the end, a new democratic government took over, and dictator Manuel Noriega was taken into U.S. custody.

The major argument of this thesis is that the United States' support of democracy is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing democracy in Haiti. The United States cannot compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings, but it can seek to affect the two most important internal factors for Haiti's democratization: civil-military relations and political institutions. U.S. support for democracy in Haiti will only succeed if the Haitian civilian government exercises control

over the military, and if Haiti's political institutions are (a) efficient and functioning properly, and (b) not inhibited by the ruling government or the military.

The internal factors are clearly central, yet the U.S. role is vitally important. The debate on the role and effectiveness of external versus internal actors, in the promotion of democracy, continues. Abraham Lowenthal writes that during the Cold War, "the overall impact of U.S. policy on Latin America's ability to achieve democratic politics was usually negligible, often counterproductive, and only occasionally positive."³ With the end of the Cold War, the United States has become increasingly supportive of democratic movements and institutions throughout the world. This thesis seeks to contribute to the assessment of the U.S. role in promoting democracy.

Sustainable democracies share certain fundamental characteristics: respect for human and civil rights, peaceful competition for political power, free and fair elections, respect for the rule of law, accountable government, and an environment that encourages participation by all sectors of the population. In theory, these ideals are great, but when faced with the reality of a consistently non-democratic state, what accounts for this form of non-democratic government? Why are the ideals not realized? Many scholars have made significant progress in developing theoretical explanations for the evolution of democratic and non-democratic rule. The following chapter reviews some of that literature.

³Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes and Issues (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 243.

II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Existing scholarly literature defines democracy in terms of three central characteristics: political competition, civil and political liberties, and political participation. According to Robert A. Dahl, meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups is the key criterion for a democracy.⁴ Juan J. Linz writes that democracy is essentially “the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability.”⁵ This procedural definition of democracy provides a basis for an assessment of conditions in Haiti and assessment of a U.S. policy toward Haiti that is designed to foster democracy as it is generally identified.

A. GENERAL OVERVIEW

The issue of imposing, promoting, or exporting democracy remains controversial. Laurence Whitehead notes that an “imported” democracy may well be less solid, and less real, than one constructed from within.⁶ Thomas Carothers writes that external actors, even the powerful ones like the United States, are limited in their ability to affect a country’s political process. He gives more credit to the weight of history, culture and independent actions of indigenous forces. Linz argues that the hope of making democracies more democratic by undemocratic means often contributes to

⁴Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 1.

⁵Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 5.

⁶Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization,” in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 46.

regime crisis, paving the way to autocratic rule.⁷ What, then, are Haiti's chances for democratic rule? Will such assistance help or hinder Haiti's democratization efforts?

According to Lowenthal, "there is broad bipartisan agreement. . . that fostering democracy in Latin America . . . is a legitimate and significant goal of the U.S. policy and that the United States can be effective in pursuing that aim."⁸ However, he argues that U.S. efforts at actively promoting democracy have been erratic, and that such efforts have often been ineffective and sometimes counterproductive. Lowenthal credits the United States with only a few instances of sustained promotion of democracy, noting that in such instances, U.S. influence was probably not the determining factor in consolidating democracy.⁹ This may very well have been the case, but today's U.S. policy and actions are seemingly different. There are successful cases like Panama and Grenada, where U.S. intervention helped foster democratization.

Despite such theory, which downplays external factors, this thesis argues that without the support of the United States, hopes for democratization in Haiti will remain shattered. External support is necessary because of Haiti's lack of experience with democracy. Haiti needs such external assistance and support for democracy if it is going to consolidate democracy.

B. FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRACY

Theorists have posited multiple factors that affect democratization. They include: historical factors, political culture, political leadership, political institutions, state structure and strength, the military, civil society and associational life, inequality, class and other cleavages, socioeconomic

⁷*Ibid*, p. 97.

⁸Lowenthal, ed., p. vii.

⁹*Ibid*, p. 261.

development, economic policies and performance, and international factors.¹⁰ The analytical challenge is to discern which factors are the most crucial, then apply those factors on a country-specific basis. For example, if one were to test the argument that high levels of economic development are a necessary condition for democratization, the cases of India and Senegal would seem to refute that argument. Furthermore, "as Linz and Stepan have emphasized, the argument that economic crisis necessarily undermines democratic regimes is belied by the experience of the 1930s in Europe. Democratic systems survived the Great Depression in all countries except Germany and Austria. . . ."¹¹

Regarding the rejection of other variables, like political culture, Larry Diamond and Linz note that "the cultural thesis is rejected on theoretical grounds both by structural determinists, who regard the concept of political culture as epiphenomenal and superfluous, . . . and by those who find the sources of political culture more varied, its nature more plastic and malleable, and its effects less decisive than the thesis allows."¹² In addition, in testing the cases of Argentina and Mexico, recent empirical analyses do not find evidence of predominantly authoritarian political cultures in these two countries that have known stable or recurrent authoritarian rule.¹³ In terms of the socioeconomic development argument, Diamond, Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset found no striking

¹⁰The variables are taken from the introduction by Diamond and Linz of Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America Vol. 4 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 2-47.

¹¹Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, p. 259.

¹²The authors note that the structural determinists' position is not taken here by any of their contributors. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset eds., p. 10.

¹³*Ibid*, p. 10.

relationship between democratic development and per capita GNP (1985). In fact, “two of the highest income countries in Latin America—Argentina and Mexico—have respectively been highly unstable and stably authoritarian. Costa Rica, whose per capita income is only slightly above the median for Latin American countries, has been the most stable democracy.”¹⁴

Despite widely accepted and substantiated scholarly views, the Haitian case could lead to a reassessment of the relative importance of external and internal actors. History has seemingly demonstrated that the only effective means of ridding Haiti of its ruling military juntas was U.S.-led intervention. Because of Haiti’s history (the lack of experience with democracy), Haiti requires the support and assistance of such external actors as the United States to make the transition to and then consolidate democracy. In addition, the importance of civil-military relations cannot be ignored, and there must be a foundation upon which to build credible political institutions. This leads to what is posited herein as the three pivotal variables most affecting democratization in Haiti. These factors were chosen because of their prominent and recurring nature throughout the literature, and because they seemingly capture the dynamics of the Haitian case.

C. THREE PIVOTAL VARIABLES

This thesis argues that there are three factors that most influence democratization in Haiti: the nature of civil-military relations; the strength of key political institutions like the political party system, the legislature, and the judiciary; and the role of the United States and its impact on democratization efforts.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 44.

1. The Nature of Civil-Military Relations

Stepan and other theorists like Michel S. Laguerre and Charles G. Gillespie espouse the importance of civil-military relations in new democratic governments. They argue that if there is a balanced relationship between civil society and the military, where civil society exercises legitimate control over the military, then such a relationship is conducive to democratic development.¹⁵ This has not been the case in most of Latin American, but especially in Haiti.

The prospects for democratization increases with the existence of a properly balanced civil-military relationship, where the civilian government exercises control over the military. The need to establish an acceptable and sustainable civil-military equilibrium is of the utmost importance for consolidating democracy. A politicized military has been a proverbial thorn in the side of most Latin American countries. Haiti is no exception, as proven by the military coup of 1991. In a newly democratic regime, democratic norms of civil-military relations must be explicitly expressed in new institutional arrangements. According to Stepan, civil and political society, along with the state, must interact, increasing the effective control over the military.¹⁶ He argues that since a monopoly of the use of force is required for a modern democracy, failure to develop capacities to control the military represents an abdication of democratic power. As a result, civilian government breaks down and the military assumes the governing role.

¹⁵Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Gillespie, "Democratic Consolidation in South America," Third World Quarterly Vol. 11 (April 1989); Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1993).

¹⁶Stepan. pp.144, 145.

Laguerre's equilibrium theory of civil-military relations postulates that the stability of a political system capable of preventing military intervention is the result of three sets of balanced relationships: those obtained between the military and civil society, between the military and civilian government, and between the civil society and the civilian government. An unresolved conflict in one or more of the relationships is potentially capable of offsetting the balance of forces, leading to military intervention. Laguerre concludes that "one cannot understand the behavior of the Haitian political system without paying attention to the military. After all, it is an empirical fact that the majority of Haitian presidential regimes have been headed by generals."¹⁷

What Gillespie identifies as pacts, are necessary in the restoration of civilian control. He argues that stable political coalitions are essential in democracies. "A reasonably 'articulated' political society is one in which the balance of power among social groups is roughly aligned with their relative strength in the institutions of the polity."¹⁸ In order for new civil-military relations to work effectively, they must be embedded in a broader democratic system, characterized by strong political institutions.

2. Strength of Political Institutions

Huntington makes the case for the importance of viable democratic institutions, asserting that "democracy has a useful meaning only when it is defined in institutional terms."¹⁹ He argues that democracy can be made only through the methods of democracy. Negotiations, compromise,

¹⁷Laguerre, p. 2.

¹⁸Gillespie, pp. 110,111.

¹⁹Huntington, "The Modest Meaning Of Democracy," in Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1989), p. 15.

and agreements must take place in democratization. Political institutions are important because without such viable institutions it is virtually impossible to consolidate democracy. As Diamond and Linz so ably point out, the strength of the political parties, the high degree of institutionalization, and the popular loyalty achieved by major parties were important elements in the institutional resistance of democracy in Latin America. A further weakness has been the lack of power and effectiveness of legislatures and judiciaries throughout Latin America, and the almost nonexistence of legislatures and judiciaries in Haiti.

Democratization is problematic if there is lack of experience with democratic political institutions; nonexistent, ineffective, or non-democratic political parties; and politicized, corrupt judiciaries. Democratic theory stresses the importance of the individual. However, in practice, democracy involves the credibility of key political institutions such as political parties, legislatures, and judiciaries. The principles of democracy must be institutionalized. The political party system, the legislature, and the judiciary must be committed to the democratic process. Workable governmental institutions must be established in which democratic theory is given meaning and made effective. Suffrage is no good unless exercised in free and significant elections. Suffrage also loses much of its value unless voters can choose between viable political parties. Political parties perform certain functions for both the elected official and the citizen, serving as "transmission belts" for societal demands. Political parties also serve as continuing bodies on whom the responsibility for achievements and failures may be placed, with rewards and/or punishments being dispensed at future elections.

The legislative and judicial institutions are specifically mentioned because of the need to balance power in the policy-making process, and because of the tendency of law-breaking. Strong,

effective mechanisms must exist to resolve conflicts. A legislature should balance the executive branch. Moreover, formulation of policy by Congress should not be isolated from judicial interpretation. In order for legislative and judicial institutions to operate effectively, they must be free of political manipulation, corruption, and intimidation. The dynamics of the Haitian case are particularly salient. Haiti is beset on every side with innumerable problems such as deforestation, lack of arable land, illiteracy, hunger, extreme poverty, low life-expectancy, violence, corruption, etc. Such problems require effective government institutions for their resolution.

Linz and Stepan are correct when they assert that “there is no need for revolutions or coups when people believe in the institutions and in the fairness of the political process, particularly in elections as a method for changing governments.”²⁰ Likewise, according to Huntington, the degree to which the democratic political system may be expected to remain in existence is dependent on the concept of institutionalization. Huntington defines institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.”²¹

Many newly democratic governments are struggling with what Diamond characterizes as “the rudiments of democratic institutions.”²² The new civil-military relationship, and the key political institutions are in desperate need of educational, financial, technical, political, and even

²⁰Linz and Stepan, “Democratic Consolidation or Destruction,” in Pastor, ed., p. 56.

²¹Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12.

²²Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy #87 (Summer 1992), p. 26.

moral support from overseas, most especially in the case of Haiti. It is at this point that U.S. support for democracy in Haiti is crucial.

The global democratic revolution cannot be sustained without a global effort of assistance.

**—Larry Diamond
1992²³**

3. U.S. Assistance/Support For Democracy

Although the third variable is generally posited as 'external actors' in the theoretical literature, the focus here is on the United States because of its continuing major role in the international system, and because of its dominant role in Haiti. The argument made here is for the importance of the United States as an external actor, in terms of its support for peace, security, prosperity, and democracy. As so ably pointed out by Diamond, "Now [1994] as in 1945, only one nation stands capable of leading and organizing the world toward these ends: the United States."²⁴

In the absence of clear-cut, detailed steps to promote democracy, this thesis seeks to address the various challenges (political, economic, and military) facing the United States in the fostering of sustainable democracy in Haiti. When it comes to the international role in democratization and consolidation of democracy in Haiti, the United States' role is crucial.

This thesis argues that in the case of Haiti, external assistance is necessary but not sufficient for democratization. However, this is not to say that the U.S. brand of democracy is for export. There is a distinction between imposing democracy and promoting it. Imposing democracy means attempting to install a particular democratic form of government through a-democratic means.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Diamond, "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order," Current History, January 1994, Vol. 93, p. 1.

Promoting democracy entails peaceful support and assistance, which is only valuable if and when a country is ready for democracy. If the United States goes beyond mere rhetoric, and is committed to support democracy, then the likelihood of democratization increases. As Paul Sigmund argues, United States policy must be firmly committed to supporting democracy as an end itself, not just a means to other ends.²⁵

Whitehead distinguishes between three components of the promotion of democracy. "First, there is pressure on undemocratic governments to democratize themselves . . . Second, there is support for fledgling democracies . . . Third, there is the maintenance of a firm stance against antidemocratic forces that threaten to overthrow established democracies . . ."²⁶ Robert Pastor posits an international democratic community as a way to prevent the political pendulum from swinging back to dictatorship, noting that not nearly enough has been done to assist in the consolidation of democracy against threats like militarism, debt, and terrorism. Pastor argues that a democratic community of the United States and other key countries in the hemisphere could take concerted action, directed at helping nominally democratic governments assert control over their militaries. Such a community could also monitor elections to solve the issue of tainted elections, as well as provide economic aid.²⁷

²⁵Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 208.

²⁶O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., p. 44.

²⁷Pastor, "Securing A Democratic Hemisphere" Foreign Policy #73 Winter, 1988-89), pp. 55, 57-59.

In his guidelines for U.S. 'Promoting Democracy' Policy, Lowenthal notes that,

democracy is not an export commodity, it cannot simply be shipped from one setting to another. By its very nature, democracy must be achieved by each nation, largely on its own. It is an internal process, rooted in a country's history, institutions, and values . . . But there is a good deal the United States can do, especially in concert with like-minded countries, to nurture and reinforce democracy in the Americas, [including:]

- First, the United States should consistently emphasize its concern with the protection of fundamental human rights . . .
- Second, the United States can cooperate with other nations to help strengthen the governmental institutions and practices that make up the very fiber of democracy. . .
- Third, U.S. officials can strengthen Latin America's prospects for democracy by providing unambiguous and consistent signals that the maintenance of democratic politics is a high priority goal of the United States. Through the advice of its military missions and the content of its training programs for example, the United States can help keep Latin America's armed forces out of politics . . .

The most decisive ways the United States can promote Latin American democracy are indirect.

- First, the United States can certainly improve Latin America's prospects for democracy by helping countries of the region cope with their fundamental economic problems . . . [and]
- Finally, the United States strengthens the democratic cause throughout the hemisphere and elsewhere when it is true to its political values and protects the vitality of its own democratic institutions.²⁸

In theory, democracy as government by the people can survive and advance only when the mass public is committed to it. In reality, some countries tend to lack many factors that facilitate the process of democratization, which can be traced back to a country's history. In the case of Haiti,

²⁸Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History," in Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes and Issues, pp. 262-264.

the desire for change was heralded by the mass uprisings that began in 1985 in response to years of repressive rule by dictatorial regimes. The Haitian people were expressing their desires for a democratic form of government after 200 years of military rule and non-democratic government.

While the United States is not in a position to remake instantaneously the Haitian society, timely and well-conceived U.S.-led assistance can contribute to the efforts of individuals in Haiti struggling to establish democracy. Is present-day U.S. support for democracy in Haiti an historical change? In the past, was there the emphasis on democratization that is so prevalent today? To what extent, if any, did the U.S. occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 affect democratization in Haiti? The next chapter seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. role, along with Haiti's dominant military and inefficient political institutions, enabled the development of the authoritarian, dictatorial regimes so prevalent throughout Haiti's history.


Many observers note that Haiti lacks a tradition of democracy, which limits its attempts at democratization. Since Haiti's history does not include a democratic form of government, the question then becomes, has this country finally broken with the legacy of its past? In terms of Haiti's political future, is the consolidation of democracy about to begin?

The following chapter examines Haitian heritage, analyzing the key factors that contributed to non-democratic rule. First, the chapter provides a synopsis of the nation's history, beginning with French colonialism. Next, the synopsis provides an account of legacies derived from U.S. intervention and occupation (1915 -1934), politicization of the armed forces, and Duvalier dictatorship. The chapter then analyzes these legacies, assessing the salience and effects of the three pivotal variables, on Haiti's democratization, as discussed in section C. This chapter argues that the three pivotal variables are the primary reason for Haiti's historical nondemocratic rule.

III. REVIEW OF HAITIAN HISTORY

Haiti is a nation of approximately seven million people for which the average annual income per head is \$320.²⁹ The Republic of Haiti, sitting on approximately 11,000 square miles, occupies the western and most ruggedly mountainous third of Hispaniola island. Haiti's closest neighbor—the Spanish-speaking Dominican Republic—occupies the other two thirds of the island. The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is about the size of the state of Maryland, and is 50 miles from the coast of Cuba at the nearest point, 130 miles from Jamaica, 600 miles from Florida, and 900 miles from Trinidad.³⁰ (for the location of Haiti, in regards to U.S. proximity, see Map 1. For an in-depth map of Haiti, see Maps 2 and 3 in Annex E and F respectively.)

Map 1. Location of Haiti



Northern Haiti, with its port at Cap-Haïtien, has a tradition of independence going back to the Kingdom of Henri Christophe (1806-1820). Central Haiti includes the plains of the Artibonite River and the commercial and government capital of Port-au-Prince. Southern Haiti, with its ports

²⁹U.S. Department of State Background Notes on Haiti, March 1995.

³⁰Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal, Haiti: The Failure of Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 14.

and markets at Jacmel and Les Cayes, has memories of being an independent republic under President Alexandre Pétion (1806-1821). Culturally, Haiti is characterized by a unique blend of African, European, and Native American cultures.³¹ Haiti is French-speaking and Catholic with most of the masses speaking Creole and practicing Voodoo.

What insight can an examination of Haiti's history provide? Haiti bears the most chaotic and disruptive history in the western hemisphere. This history has strongly shaped the nation's development or lack thereof, as well as its propensity for non-democratic rule. Haiti's is a grim political legacy. Since the slave rebellion, the country has never had a stable democratic government, and has endured extreme violence and brutality. This implies that there is no useful civil or political heritage for democracy.

A. LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM

Haiti won its independence from France in 1804. In the Americas, only the United States won its independence prior to Haiti. Haiti became the first and only black republic created as a result of a slave rebellion, which lasted from 1791 to 1804. Since independence, Haiti has witnessed a number of insurrections, revolutions, coups d'état, and civil wars.

Independent Haiti's founding fathers, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Alexandre Pétion, and Henri Christophe dubbed themselves Emperors and Kings. These legendary leaders set the stage for Haiti's future development. It was during the first two decades of independence that the Haitian society began to take shape in a devastated, isolated country filled with illiterate former slaves, along with a few mulattoes, and devoid of any type of democratic institutions.

³¹*Ibid.*

Although Haiti was the second nation in the Americas to declare its independence, the United States did not recognize Haiti's independence until June 5, 1862 under President Abraham Lincoln. The United States was reluctant to recognize Haiti because slavery remained in force in the southern United States. The sudden independence of an enormous group of ex-slaves seemingly posed a threat to pro-slavery proponents in the United States. The demonstration effect of a successful slave rebellion threatened the economic interests of slave-holders in the United States, who depended on the slavery-plantation system. According to Robert and Nancy Heinl, the South's secession from the United States resulted in important diplomatic gains for Haiti.

On 3 December 1861, Abraham Lincoln told Congress: 'If any good reason exists why we should persevere longer in withholding our recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia, I am unable to discern it.' With Southern members absent, legislation providing for U.S. missions in both countries handily passed and was signed by the Emancipator [Lincoln]. . . on 5 June 1862. On 27 September, Benjamin F. Whidden, a New Hampshire abolitionist, arrived in Port-au-Prince and presented his credentials as the United States' first full-scale envoy to Haiti.³²

Thus, after 58 years, the United States finally recognized the Republic of Haiti.

1. Situational Overview: Colonial Society (1791 - 1843)

The following section examines Haitian colonial society broadly within the context of Stepan's definition of civil society. He defines civil society as

that arena where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists, trade

³²Heinl, Jr., and Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1991-1971 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987), p. 222.

unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests.³³

In the 18th century Haiti was a rich, French colony where hundreds of thousands of Negro slaves worked on the sugar and coffee plantations owned by white settlers. The long period of turmoil which began with a slave revolt in 1791, and culminated with a declaration of independence in 1804, set this country on a turbulent course of isolationism and internal strife.

Haitian society reflects, for the most part, the historic impact of French colonization and the importation of slaves from Africa. There are virtually no traces of Spanish culture or of the culture of the Taino (Arawak) Indians who inhabited the island when it was discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1492.³⁴

Colonialism was antidemocratic by its very nature. French colonialism left a tradition of hostility to political authority, a tendency toward corruption and immorality in public and private life, an example of ostentatious wealth display, as well as a notorious lack of concern for sanitation and cleanliness in colonial urban centers. The French colonials were only interested in economic exploitation of its colonies. Post-independent Haiti not only suffered from its relative small size and lack of economic prosperity, but also from a lack of social, economic, political, and cultural contact with the rest of the world. Additionally, the fact that Haitian constitutions, until 1915, forbade foreign land ownership did nothing to further the end of Haitian isolationism.³⁵

³³Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, pp. 3-4.

³⁴Forced labor, abuse, diseases, growth of *mestizo* (mixed European and Indian) population, etc., contributed to the elimination of the Taino and their culture.

³⁵Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 48.

Haiti's self-imposed limits were due in large measure to its militaristic government—a government predominantly under military control. Moreover, such limits were compounded by the restrictions imposed by international actors like the United States and France. After Haiti's independence and subsequent occupation of the Dominican Republic, all organizational infrastructure and institutions were wiped out over the entire island of Hispaniola.³⁶ Haitian colonial society was plagued by the lack of experience of Haitian rulers, isolationism, and economic poverty. As the only significant authority, the newly independent republic was built and controlled by the military, who had as a primary goal; their own self-interest. Thus, in terms of a political background, all Haiti could claim was corrupt military dictatorship.

2. Political Climate: Pre-U.S. Intervention (1843 -1915)

This section describes the Haitian political climate broadly within the context of Stepan's definition of political society. He defines political society as "that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus."³⁷ In essence, a democratizing society must include key political institutions like political parties, legislatures, judiciary, elections, etc.

Governments were normally set up and changed by military force with rulers too preoccupied with mere survival to devote attention to constructive activities. Haiti's internal

³⁶Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic from 1822 to 1844. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., p. 428.

³⁷Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, p. 4. He uses the word 'polity' to raise the classic Aristotelian concern of how people organize themselves collectively. For Aristotle's argument, see *The Politics*, Book 1, Chapter 1, Sections 6-7, 14-15.

politics lacked cohesiveness and direction. As widely noted, Haitian politics were dominated by a few elites, and a succession of military strongmen who controlled the presidency.

Haiti has had more than 20 constitutions, 16 of which were promulgated prior to U.S. intervention in 1915. The first was set up by Toussaint L'Ouverture after the successful slave revolution. It was not, however, accepted by Napoleon Bonaparte. Christophe promulgated another constitution and crowned himself King Henri I of Haiti, ruling over the northern half of the country, while Pétion ruled the southern part of the republic as the first president-for-life.³⁸ Succeeding presidents revised constitutions to suit their own political aims. President Jean-Pierre Boyer, who succeeded Pétion in the southern republic, reclaimed the northern kingdom after Christophe committed suicide. Haiti was no longer a divided nation.

Moral decadence in white colonial social and political life, plus frequent scandals in the Catholic church establishment and the colonial inclination to revolt against the authority of the mother country, established a heritage of political instability and corruption that survived the war for independence.³⁹

The framework of Haitian politics was destined to be intrigue, conspiracy, treachery, violence, coups, regional wars, and overall instability. It was not until U.S. intervention and occupation that some semblance of order was restored to Haiti.

B. LEGACIES OF U.S. INTERVENTION & OCCUPATION (1915 - 1934)

The United States intervened in Haiti for economic and geopolitical reasons as well as for political instability in Haiti. The Americans wanted to control the finances so as to protect

³⁸From 1807 to 1820 Haiti was divided into a northern kingdom and a southern republic due to the nation's split into two rival enclaves.

³⁹Haggerty, ed., Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies (Headquarters, Department of the Army: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 25, 211-218.

American interests there, remain dominant in the Caribbean area,⁴⁰ and prevent further erosion of the Haitian political system.

A treaty set up in 1915 and signed by a Haitian government set up under the protection of American marines gave American officials control of the Haitian government's most important functions: the financial administration, the organization and training of a new police force, and the execution of measures necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the Republic.⁴¹ Under this arrangement, the United States and its appointed Haitian president, ruled Haiti together. There was little concern for democracy or Haiti's sovereignty.

One of the major legacies of the U.S. occupation was a rekindled Haitian nationalism, because the Americans preferred to rule the country through *mulatto* politicians.⁴² This was resented by the Haitians, particularly the darker-skinned 'black' Haitians. Other U.S. legacies include a few new schools, a telephone system, new bridges, and repaired roads.⁴³ Additionally, U.S. marines successfully quelled the 1918-19 *cacos* rural rebellion, led by Charlemagne Peralte.⁴⁴

Another important legacy was the professionalized Garde d'Haiti which, though trained by U.S. Marines to be disciplined, hierarchical, and above all, nonpolitical, soon came to serve as the key to political power and wealth. According to Robert Rotberg,

⁴⁰This was particularly important due to the Panama Canal issue.

⁴¹Laguerre., pp. 74-75.

⁴²*Mulattoes* are the offspring of white and black parents.

⁴³The roads were courtesy of forced-labor gangs toiling under American Marines.

⁴⁴*Cacos* were peasant guerrilla fighters (paramilitary) - similar to *Tonton Macoutes*.

outgoing Americans hoped that the hastily promoted leaders of the Garde would, like the officers of the constabulary in the Dominican Republic, in Cuba, and in Nicaragua, check the excesses of the political cliques in ways which could not be expected from the judiciary or the legislature. It was soon realized, however, that this was an illusory hope, for the American occupation had failed completely to cure the fundamental structural malaise of Haitian political life. Nor had it managed to set the republic on a profoundly new economic road. Instead, the Americans had prepared Haiti for a continuation of authoritarianism and a renewal of instability.⁴⁵

After the U.S. occupation, Haiti was back on its chaotic course of development. According to Alain Rouquié, military forces like the Garde, gratuitously imposed on nations of limited sovereignty, gave rise to a certain militarism.⁴⁶ For instance, a major problem with the legacy of the Garde was that it ended up filling two functions: both army and police. Laguerre notes that "this situation was the beginning of the role of the army as police. In 1990, the army was still the only police force in Haiti."⁴⁷ This fact contributed to the military's ability to overthrow the Haitian government in 1991, and maintain control until the 1994 U.S.-led intervention.

C. LEGACIES OF POLITICIZATION OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES (1934 -1957)

The primary organizational experience of Haiti's early rulers was from war, so it was natural for them to use the military in whatever capacity necessary to govern the newly independent nation. This set a pattern for direct involvement of the military in politics and internal security issues that

⁴⁵Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), p. 146.

⁴⁶Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), p. 120.

⁴⁷Laguerre, p. 79.

continued for more than 150 years. It can be asserted that the Haitianization⁴⁸ of the Garde was the rebirth of a politicized military. Additionally, Laguerre points out that the 'director' role played by the military further contributed to its politicization, "that is the formation of subgroups and the politicization of the administrative process in the army."⁴⁹

Compounding the problem of politicization, the military also served as the police force. As such, the military could engage in corruption at will, and enjoy additional legal income. Only with military compliance could a constitutional mandate to separate the army from the police be implemented. Laguerre reports that "the military intervention of 1946 was the first formal intervention of the army as a bureaucracy . . . This intervention served as a model for later military interventions in Haiti and provided the military with the opportunity to change the course of Haitian politics."⁵⁰ The tradition of Haitian presidents' refusal to step down at the end of their term, along with rampant corruption, left the military with the task of restoring order. The Haitian military, having a monopoly of force, had little choice but to resume control of the nation's affairs. A politicized military has been a proverbial thorn in the side of most Latin American countries. Clearly, Haiti is no exception.

D. LEGACIES OF DICTATORSHIP: THE DUVALIERS (1957 - 1986)

When the U.S. Marines landed in Port-au-Prince on July 28, 1915, Francois Duvalier was an eight-year old child; by the time they left, he was a nationalist intellectual of 27. Duvalier was

⁴⁸Negotiations/preparation for resumption of Haitian control of the Garde upon U.S. withdrawal.

⁴⁹Laguerre, p. 98.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 90.

a physician who had worked widely in rural Haiti and was inspired by a rekindled nationalism. After entering politics and witnessing the 1950 overthrow of Haitian President Dumarsais Estimé, the deposed minister of labor, Duvalier learned a valuable lesson that would have grave consequences for the Haitian military. This lesson was twofold: he could not underestimate the power of the military; and in order to maintain sole dictatorial power, the military must be depoliticized and stripped of its enormous power.

The Duvalier regime was a paternalistic family dictatorship that controlled Haiti from 1957 to 1986, using a private army of enforcers known as the *Tonton Macoutes* to repress dissent and maintain order. Dr. Francois Duvalier was elected president on September 22, 1957 and went on to establish a dictatorship based on terror, manipulation, and co-optation of the citizenry. He carried on the Haitian tradition of ruling as president-for-life. In 1971, Jean-Claude assumed the presidency after his father's death, not so much because he was politically inclined, but because Papa Doc decreed it. Jean-Claude's excessive corruption and cronyism drained what little resources the country had left.

1. *Papa Doc* (1957 - 1971)

Because of the turbulent Haitian state of affairs,⁵¹ from the very beginning Duvalier was obsessed with retaining power. The lesson Duvalier drew from the military's 1950 overthrow of President Estimé was that the military could not be trusted. Thus, he acted upon this lesson when he gained power. As reported by Graham Norton, "Papa Doc smashed the power of the mulattoes

⁵¹The country echoed with bombings, a series of plots, conspiracies and calls to revolt.

with cruel and systematic terror. A black nationalist who admired Hitler . . . , he adopted the Hitlerian maxim of *schrecklichkeit* (frightfulness)."⁵²

High on Papa Doc's agenda was the depoliticization of the army and its transformation into an institution that would most benefit and contribute to the grounding of his regime. One of the most important legacies from Papa Doc was his goal to *Duvalierize* the military (i.e., to make it his very own, an extension of his right arm). This he did by neutralizing the military as an institution, making it incapable of any independent action. As early as 1961, Papa Doc decided to close the military academy so that more loyalist, non-commissioned officers would be promoted via their affiliation with his regime to ranks previously held by academy graduates.⁵³

Another very significant legacy left by Papa Doc was his creation of the single most defining institution of his regime—the *Tonton Macoutes*. He created this group after the Dade County Deputy Sheriffs' Invasion, or *l'affaire Pasquet*,⁵⁴ which he successfully quelled. The *Tonton Macoutes* who had overwhelming power, acted as a militia, a mass political organization, a religious sect, a secret police, and a terrorist unit. Laguerre writes that "the substantial number of *Macoutes* entering the army led to the deprofessionalization and continued politicization of [the Haitian] military institution."⁵⁵ By 1963, the regime was spending more than half its budget on the Presidential Guard and the *Macoutes*. The rest of the money disappeared via corruption. Other legacies included the

⁵²Norton, "Haiti: Goodbye to 'People Power'," *The World Today*, Vol. 44 (February 1988), p. 21.

⁵³Laguerre, p. 111.

⁵⁴An eight-man invasion launched from Florida in the ninth month of Papa Doc's regime.

⁵⁵Laguerre, p. 119.

elimination of freedom of the press and freedom to organize political parties. In addition, Duvalier replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral body. He then decreed presidential and legislative elections.

Papa Doc's extreme brutality, in wiping out all opposition, forced the majority of Haiti's professional people to flee. Haitian doctors, nurses, lawyers, economists, and other technicians fled the country, totaling approximately 80 percent of Haiti's professionals by the mid-1960s.⁵⁶ After devastating brutality at a Sunday Mass, the Vatican withdrew the papal nuncio. Under Papa Doc, Haiti became the horror of the hemisphere—a land where, in human terms, conditions were according to Bernard Diederich and Al Burt, far worse than under the more widely publicized and condemned communist regime of Fidel Castro.⁵⁷

In January 1971 Papa Doc announced his successor, his 19 year old son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. The constitution was changed to lower the age of eligibility for the Presidency from 40 to 18, and a referendum was held so that Haitians could officially affirm that Jean-Claude was their choice. Francois Duvalier died April 21, 1971 and his son assumed the presidency.

2. *Baby Doc* (1971 - 1986)

Jean-Claude's first few years as Haiti's ninth president-for-life were mostly uneventful—an extension of his father's rule. Eventually, Baby Doc vastly expanded the scope of corruption. That corruption would lead to his downfall.

⁵⁶Bellegarde-Smith, p. 97.

⁵⁷Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 11-12.

In terms of civil-military relations, Baby Doc reopened the military academy and created the Leopards Corps as a way of counterbalancing the *Tonton Macoutes*. On one hand, his treatment of the *Tonton Macoutes* undid some of the negative legacy inherited from his father, but the academy proved to be just another formal way of maintaining the system of dictatorial rule.⁵⁸

Baby Doc's marriage to Michelle Bennett, a mulatto, further alienated the *Tonton Macoutes* and the Duvalierist political establishment. Thus, Baby Doc lost the firm support of the *Macoutes* and others who had backed his father.

Haitians experienced increased political repression under Baby Doc. The situation would eventually lead to widespread discontent. Riots, beginning in October 1985, overwhelmed the indecisive Duvalier and prompted military conspirators to demand his resignation, which led to his flight into exile in February 1986. The 29-year dynastic dictatorship had finally ended.

The Duvalier dictatorships left behind a country economically ravaged by greed and corruption, a country bereft of functional political institutions and a legacy of non-peaceful rule. According to Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, the Duvalier dictatorships from 1957 to 1986 were easily Haiti's most brutal experiences in two centuries. Reportedly, between 20,000 and 50,000 Haitians were murdered during the Duvalier regimes, and about one-fifth of the population went abroad in political or economic exile, the second highest ratio in the Western Hemisphere (Puerto Rico has the highest migration ratio).⁵⁹

With the exception of U.S. intervention and occupation (1915 -1934), Haiti has had an unbroken succession of dictators since the 1800s. Authoritarian dictators have governed this

⁵⁸Laguerre, p. 113.

⁵⁹Bellegarde-Smith, p. 97.

country for over a century and a half. What lasting effects has this type of history had on Haiti? To answer this question, having traced historical legacies of the Haitian polity, the next section will analyze these legacies in terms of the three major variables. The purpose of this analysis is to explain the tendency of the Haitian polity toward dictatorial, authoritarian rule.

E. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE THREE MAJOR VARIABLES (1791 -1986)

Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal point out that “history is more of a living presence in Haiti than in any other island of the Caribbean.”⁶⁰ The following section which examines Haiti’s historical legacy and its impact, focuses on the three pivotal variables that most affect democracy in Haiti: civil-military relations, strength of key political institutions, and the U.S. role.

1. Civil-Military Relations

In examining Haiti’s past, one finds a legacy of military rule and an inability to properly balance civil-military relations. Not that this was ever a goal. The history of Haiti has with minor exceptions been that of a series of dictatorships in which the military designated a man to act as dictator, kept him in power, and determined his successor by either revolution or control of elections. Haggerty writes that:

Consolidation of political power in the hands of strongmen has made the armed forces the institutional pillar of Haitian society. Born of revolutionary violence and plagued by socioeconomic deterioration, Haiti never succeeded in building civilian institutions capable of rivaling military rule.⁶¹

Haggerty adds that “as in other countries occupied by the United States in the early twentieth century, the local military was often the only cohesive and effective institution left in the wake of

⁶⁰Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: The Failure of Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992,) p. 15.

⁶¹Haggerty, p. 353.

withdrawal.”⁶² This was the case in Haiti, and it served to reinforce the military’s propensity to intervene in politics. The Haitian military mentality was shaped by decades of military control. Over the years, the military has developed so many prerogatives that they find it difficult to cede power. The Haitian armed forces have been the single, most serious impediment to the development of democracy in Haiti.

In the history of Haitian civil-military relations, there were periods of political stability where the military was less inclined to intervene. However, for the most part, there was no such thing as a properly balanced relationship between the infrequent civilian government and the military. According to Laguerre, “in the nineteenth century, the army served as the government, and this constituted a problem, or more precisely, an obstacle for the establishment of democracy in Haiti.”⁶³

A good example of a Haitian administration’s tenuous civilian control is the end of the Jean-Claude Duvalier government. In 1985, the same time that the masses were rioting against the dictator, the military also distanced itself from the regime. This instability eventually led to Jean-Claude’s 1986 removal from office and rule by a military-dominated National Council of Government (*Conseil National de Gouvernement* - CNG). The primary goal of most Haitian leaders has been to retain power for as long as possible. This in itself is a significant legacy that hinders the viability of a democratic political system.

2. Strength of Political Institutions

Fragile democratic institutions were immobilized by Haiti’s historical experiences. Instability is attributable to the weakness of the nation’s institutions and to complete inexperience

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁶³Laguerre, p. 63.

with pluralistic democratic government.⁶⁴ As acknowledged by constitutions, elections, etc., the government had some of the forms of democracy but never the substance. For instance, the 1987 constitution was the most balanced in Haitian history, extending the powers of the legislature to check the president. However, it was promptly set aside by the military. The wheel of Haitian politics has been in almost continuous revolution since independence. By now the country had become accustomed to brutality, violence, corruption, and distorted political institutions. See Table 1 for a glimpse of the Haitian political record for some of its heads of state.

Table 1: Haitian Heads of State: Political Record

	OF 35 HAITIAN HEADS OF STATE	SELECTED PRESIDENTS
9	PRESIDENTS-FOR LIFE	PAPA DOC & BABY DOC
1	COMMITTED SUICIDE	CHRISTOPHE
1	EXECUTED	SALNAVE
2	ASSASSINATED	DESSALINES & GUILLAUME SAM
22	OVERTHROWN	
17	SERVED MORE THAN FOUR YEARS	
6	FINISHED THEIR TERMS IN OFFICE	
7	DIED IN OFFICE	

Source: Anthony P. Maingot, "Haiti: Problems of a Transition to Democracy in an Authoritarian Soft State," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, Winter 1986-87, p. 82.

The simple fact that Haitian heads of state have drafted and abolished constitutions at will is a good example of the ineffectiveness of the democratic political system. The 1987 constitution that replaced the Duvalierist 1983 constitution, with a relatively free and fair popular referendum,

⁶⁴Haggerty, p. 199.

was never taken seriously by the regime. True to tradition, the constitution was suspended by President Henri Nampy in 1988, and only partially reinstated by President Prosper Avril in 1989.⁶⁵

The lack of a democratic tradition, most blatant during the Duvalier era, impeded, if not made impossible, the normal formation of political parties based on social interest groups. Political parties have existed in name for a long time, but they have not exerted any independent influence on the political system. Rather, parties have served as campaign vehicles for individual politicians. See Table 2 for some of Haiti's political parties.

Table 2: Major Haitian Political Parties

YEARS	POLITICAL PARTIES
1870s-1880s	LIBERAL PARTY; NATIONAL PARTY
1915-1934	PATRIOTIC UNION; NATIONALIST UNION
1946	POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY; UNIFIED DEMOCRATIC PARTY; WORKER PEASANT MOVEMENT; COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI; HAITIAN REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
1956-1957	NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIAL PARTY; NATIONAL UNITY PARTY
1987	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARTY OF HAITI; MOVEMENT FOR THE INSTALLATION OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI; NATIONAL COOPERATION FRONT

Source: Haggerty, ed., "Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies," 1991.

Additionally, under the rule of Francois Duvalier, the court system was practically non-existent. For all intents and purposes, Duvalier suspended Haiti's Judicial system. This is not noted as unusual because historically the judiciary has been the weakest branch of the Haitian government.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 330.

The Haitian president had little control over the courts because the judges were in office for life. This legacy stems from early Haitian constitutions. There were vain attempts at suspending the irremovability of judges provision in the constitution of 1918. This constitution was approved by referendum in 1918. However, legislative members had initially refused to approve the constitution purportedly authored by U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt—as a result, President Philippe Dartiguenave dissolved the legislature in 1917.⁶⁶

Haitian internal politics has consistently lacked cohesiveness or direction. While the democratic and egalitarian ideology of the French Revolution was officially adopted by the infant nation, the ideals were never translated into reality. Thus, Haiti's democratic political system was inherently flawed and subsequently ineffective, due primarily to the Haitians' lack of experience with democratic institutions but also to the role of the United States. For example, Schmidt asserts that,

instead of building from existing democratic institutions which, on paper, were quite impressive and had long incorporated the liberal democratic philosophy and governmental machinery associated with the French Revolution, the United States blatantly overrode them and illegally forced through its own authoritarian, antidemocratic system.⁶⁷

Schmidt maintains that the United States was convinced that Haitians were incapable of self-government—so much so, that the U.S. occupation consistently suppressed local democratic institutions and denied elementary political liberties. However, with the Haitian political history of military dominance, chaos, and instability, just how viable were any such institutions and liberties? Even if the United States had actively sought a democratic form of government during

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁶⁷Schmidt, p. 10.

the 1915 - 1934 occupation, Haiti did not have the proper balance between civil-military relations, nor efficient political institutions. Thus, U.S. assistance and support for democracy would have been insufficient for post-U.S. occupation democratization.

3. U.S. Assistance/Support for Democracy

U.S. support for democracy, financial assistance, and pressure can be a powerful stimulus and propelling force. The question then is one of goals and actions. As pointed out by Paul W. Drake, "In Haiti, the United States became an accomplice in the suspension of direct elections and of an elected congress for over a decade. The Wilson administration and its successors became willing to settle for nominal constitutionalism."⁶⁸

The isolation Haiti experienced, in its infant state, was detrimental to the country's development. The United States neither recognized Haiti's independence nor supported it, even though American intervention in 1800 had helped to establish the independence of Toussaint L'Ouverture.⁶⁹ Because Haitian independence challenged the foundation of the existing international system in which enormous profits were made through colonization and slavery, Haiti was isolated for decades. The biggest fear was that the Haitian Revolution might have a destabilizing effect on the slave-holding southern United States and other European colonies. As pointed out by Bellegarde-Smith, "the fear that the Haitian Revolution would spread existed until the U.S. Civil War."⁷⁰ Despite the assistance Haiti provided to Latin American independence

⁶⁸Drake, "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932," Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes and Issues, p. 18.

⁶⁹Schmidt, p. 27.

⁷⁰Bellegarde-Smith, p. 50.

movements, it was excluded from the 'protection' afforded by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Additionally, due to U.S. pressure, Haiti's invitation to attend the first inter-American conclave, the Panama Congress of 1826, was withdrawn. Bellegarde-Smith provides an interesting account of Haitian aid to Latin American revolutionaries. For instance,

Dessalines [Haitian president] had received Francisco Miranda, an early leader of the northern Latin American independence movement, in 1805 and had allowed him to leave Haiti with a contingent of Haitian volunteers. In 1815 and 1816, President Pétion welcomed Simón Bolívar, and Bolívar was influenced by the Haitian constitutional provision for a lifetime presidency. . . in March 1816, Bolívar also left Haiti with men, money, munitions, weapons, and a small press for printing South American revolutionary literature and the proclamation abolishing slaves. Bolívar began by freeing his own 1,500 slaves—Haiti's only demand.⁷¹

In a formal 1838 treaty, France recognized Haiti's independence. Likewise, wording of a treaty in 1839 indicated diplomatic recognition from England. Neither of these treaties had any effect on the U.S. decision of non-recognition. Haiti's pleas to recognize its independence went unanswered until the 1862 emancipation of the slaves in the United States by U.S. President Lincoln.

A major external shock to the Haitian system of dictatorial rule was the 1915 to 1934 U.S. occupation, but this episode failed to lay the foundations for democracy. Instead, it created a new destructive mechanism, namely the army, by which the authoritarian state could be preserved.

As pointed out by Diederich and Burt, Haitians have long been thinking about a democratic form of government. However, concerning reports of post-Papa Doc contingency plans for the United States and hemisphere troops to land in Haiti to peacefully export democracy, Diederich and

⁷¹*Ibid.*

Burt were vehemently opposed to another U.S. intervention, favoring a Haitian resolution.⁷² They believed Haiti could and should democratize 'from within' and on its own. This thesis argues, however, that Haiti has demonstrated an historical inability to democratize solely from within. While internal factors are crucial to the success of democracy in Haiti, the support and assistance provided by a dominant actor like the United States is also very important. As so persuasively argued by Diamond and Linz, the U.S. impact on democracy has varied depending on the administration. Diamond and Linz writes that "when it has wanted to, the United States has been able to assist the cause of democracy in the region, but only when there have been democratic forces and institutions able to make effective use of that assistance."⁷³ The 1994/1995 U.S. support for democracy in Haiti could allow Haiti the time it needs to refine its institutions and build up stronger democratic forces.

F. SUMMARY

According to Rotberg, "modern Haiti is a prisoner of its past."⁷⁴ This chapter's attempt to examine Haiti's overall experience and assess the salience and effects of the major theoretical variables, contribute to Rotberg's assessment. What in Haiti's history hindered democratic development? Why did U.S. intervention and occupation (1915 -1934) not put this country on the path to democratization? Such questions are answered in this analysis of Haiti's political history.

History goes a long way in explaining the unbalanced state of Haitian civil-military relations, and how Haiti's military developed into such a strong institution. The historical past also explains

⁷²Diederich and Burt, p. xii.

⁷³Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., p. 50.

⁷⁴Rotberg, p. 24.

that it is not so much the lack of institutions, but rather the ineffectiveness of, and complete disregard for these institutions by Haitian presidents and the military that have undermined democracy. Finally, U.S. assistance has not historically been aimed at developing a democratic state. One of the primary goals of the U.S. intervention and occupation of 1915 to 1934 was to restore order to a Haitian society enmeshed in total political disarray. This disarray was such that U.S. intervention was necessary to protect external interests. In other words, and as suggested by Sigmund, U.S. policy was not firmly focused on supporting democracy. At that time, democracy was not the end itself. Instead, democracy was a means to an end. That end being protection of U.S. geopolitical and economic interests.

Since Haiti's 1804 independence, and even after the 1862 U.S. recognition, there has been very little evidence of U.S. support for democracy in Haiti. Instead, U.S.-Haitian relations were affected by the perception of threat posed by the Haitian Revolution. Many within the United States feared the demonstration effect of the Black Republic of Haiti, and as a result the United States banned trade with Haiti in 1806, renewing this embargo in 1807 and 1809. The 'great fear' (the existence of a nation of armed ex-slaves) was such that despite the resumption of trade relations (e.g., from 1820-1821 when Haitian-U.S. trade amounted to \$4.5 million), Haiti could not gain formal diplomatic recognition from the United States until the United States addressed its own issue of slavery with the 1862 emancipation of U.S. slaves.⁷⁵

Haiti was isolated and virtually cut off from the international system because of the desire, harbored by external actors, to exploit colonization and slavery. This desire was especially salient in the case of the southern United States. Despite these daunting circumstances, and Haiti's own

⁷⁵Bellegarde-Smith, pp. 49, 52.

financial problems and frequent revolutions, Haiti, unlike most Latin American countries, paid all its foreign obligations in an effort to forestall foreign intervention. It was not until the loss of Haiti's coffee market with France at the onset of World War I, and the advent of foreign interest in Haiti's economically weak government, that U.S. intervention and occupation was deemed necessary.

Weak states on the perilous path to democracy will continue to require control of the military, strength of political institutions, and firm assistance and support for democratic development from external actors. U.S. support for democracy (1915 -1934) did not compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings, in terms of civil-military relations and political institutions. Moreover, the nature of U.S. support affected Haiti's prospects for democracy. In other words, the lack of U.S. support for democracy contributed to the authoritarian form of government that emerged after the U.S. departure from Haiti in 1934.

Despite the elections of 1990, creating a democracy will be a novel experience for Haitians. In the wake of dictatorship, Haitians must learn to live by rules of fair play and consensus-making. Military domination, manipulative techniques of control, and official lawlessness have been deeply embedded in the political society. The military so dominated political life that the foundations of democratic community—such as free expression, honest elections, a representative legislature, an impartial judiciary, and a government administrative system at the service of the people—became subverted.⁷⁶ Haitian military rule left no room for the three central characteristics of democracy: political competition, civil and political liberties, and political participation.

⁷⁶Gabriel Marcella, "The Latin American Military: Low Intensity Conflict and Democracy," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol 32 (Spring 1990), pp. 61-62.

IV. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI (1986 - 1995)

This chapter examines the situation in Haiti from 1986 to September 1995, assessing the salience and effect of the three independent variables: civil-military relations, effective political institutions, and U.S. assistance/support for democracy. The pages that follow analyzes the 1994/1995 U.S.-led attempt to restore democracy to Haiti, as well as events leading up to this intervention, beginning with the Haitian peoples' expression of their desire for change to a democratic form of government. Responding to years of repressive, dictatorial rule, the Haitian desire for change erupted in mass uprisings in 1985.

The argument here is that U.S. support for democracy in Haiti is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing democracy in Haiti. U.S. support will only succeed if Haiti gains and maintains effective civilian control over the Haitian armed forces, and if effective and legitimate political institutions are functioning properly. The internal factors are clearly central, yet the U.S. role is vitally important. Haiti is finally free of the dynastic Duvalier dictatorship characterized by 29 years of merciless violence, corruption, abuse, and complete dominance. Jean-Bertrand Aristide writes,

Happily, in 1986, to the astonishment of the whole world, the Haitian people overthrew a dictatorial regime that had lasted thirty years. That was the beginning of the end of a dictatorship whose marks are ineffaceable. The more those marks stare us in the face, the louder we cry out: "Liberty or death, liberty or death!"⁷⁷

The end of Duvalierism in 1986 did not signal new beginnings for this small island nation—the plight of the Haitian people did not improve by much. However, since 1986,

⁷⁷Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Aristide: an Autobiography (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), p. 190.

nongovernmental efforts increased. For instance, the organizing of activities in rural areas, inspired by Roman Catholic priests and lay people, contributed to a significant cooperative movement. Emerging political parties attempted to articulate interests and programs to attract support. The beginnings of a trade union movement to organize urban workers was underway. The Papaye Peasant Movement, a grass roots movement, promoting rural self-help and basic services among urban poor, was making valiant efforts at building institutions and promoting specific values.⁷⁸ These efforts, along with the mass demonstrations of February 1986 that ended with Jean-Claude Duvalier's flight into exile, and the new 1987 constitution sparked a hope for democratic change.

The hopes and dreams of a democratic government were quickly dashed in traditional Haitian style. In other words, the military resumed control of the government. They would rule for five years amidst chaos and confusion. During these years there were a series of coups d'état beginning February 7, 1986 and extending to September 30, 1991: the February 1986 National Council of Government (CNG) led by General Henri Namphy; the abortive election of November 29, 1987; the January 17, 1988 election of Leslie Manigat; the overthrow of President Manigat by General Namphy on January 20, 1988; the removal of Namphy by General Prosper Avril on September 17, 1988; the departure of General Avril on March 10, 1990; and his replacement by Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot prior to the democratically-elected Aristide on December 16, 1990, who was overthrown by the Haitian military September 30, 1991.

Trouillot, the new interim, civilian president brought to power in March 1990 by civilians instead of the military, inspired a rebirth of hope for democracy in the Haitian people that eventually led to the first democratic election in December 1990.

⁷⁸Weinstein and Segal, pp. 2-3.

A. HAITI'S SHATTERED HOPES FOR DEMOCRACY (1991)

Haiti's cries for liberty began in 1791 with the first slave revolution, through which hundreds of thousands of slaves freed themselves from the yokes of repression. Haiti won its first independence from France in 1804. Then on February 7, 1991 Aristide together with the Haitian people, proclaimed Haiti's second independence as he assumed the presidency, after that country's first free and fair democratic elections.

Many scholars (among them, Huntington, Diamond, and Linz) argue that leadership plays a significant role in the installation of democracy. Huntington argues that political leaders cause democracy more so than factors or causes, as he labels them in his book, The Third Wave. According to Huntington, although political leaders are needed for liberalization, certain preconditions must also be present. He adds that "in the late 1980s, the obstacles to democracy in Haiti were such as to confound even the most skilled and committed democratic leader."⁷⁹ Diamond and Linz also argue for the importance of political leadership. They associate the overall success or failure of democracy, over time, with the effectiveness of democratically-elected leaders in state building and economic development. In Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, the skills, values, strategies, and choices of political leaders figure prominently in the explanation of the varied experiences with democracy in Latin America.⁸⁰ Although not explored as a crucial variable in this thesis, the role of leadership, regarding democratic development warrants a brief synopsis. To this end, the two Haitian leaders, whose roles were significant are presented. In

⁷⁹Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, pp. 107-108.

⁸⁰Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, pp. 14-15.

addition, U.S. decisions, in response to the Haitian situation, made by U.S. President William Clinton are briefly examined.

1. Jean-Bertrand Aristide (February - September 1991; 1994-1995)



Aristide was born July 15, 1953 to a poor family in Port-Salut, a coastal village in southern Haiti. His father died when he was very young, and his mother moved the family to Port-au-Prince. He has just one sister, Anne-Marie. Aristide felt the call to priesthood early and studied theology, psychology, and philosophy, first in Haiti, then in the Dominican Republic, Israel, Egypt, England, Italy, Canada, and Greece. He speaks six languages and reads eight.⁸¹

Aristide benefitted from a popular coalition of movements and parties that had been actively organizing since the aborted 1987 elections. The most important component of this support was a movement known as the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD)-*Konakom*. The rural Papaye Peasant Movement also supported Aristide. Members of the movement went door to door on election day to get the voters out.

Amid fear and misery, the Haitian people continued their fight against tyranny. On December 16, 1990, Haitians went to the polls, hoping to triumph over institutionalized violence and to restore peace. They freely elected as their new president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who promised sweeping changes. Just who is this man who promised such changes never before witnessed in Haiti?

⁸¹Aristide is fluent in French, Latin, Greek, English, Spanish, Italian, and Creole.

First and foremost a priest, Aristide decided at the last moment to enter the presidential race. The fiery Roman Catholic priest, known for his provocative sermons, was expelled from his Salesian order for promoting class struggle among the Haitian masses. On December 5, 1990 there was an attempt to prevent Aristide from completing his electoral campaign. At an election rally in Pétionville, near Port-au-Prince, grenades were thrown into a crowd of supporters. Although Aristide escaped serious injury, eight supporters were killed and 70 wounded. Still, Aristide won the 1990 election by a landslide, with 66.7 percent of the vote. His closest opponent, Marc Bazin⁸² only polled 15.4 percent of the vote.

As for his affinity with and popularity among the masses, he was viewed as possibly the last hope of a people. This stems from his upbringing. In his autobiography, Aristide remembers summer visits to his grandfather's farm: "I would have been scolded if I had not greeted every peasant and every family with equal respect."⁸³ He claims to have learned a great lesson early in life to "remember at every moment that no matter how poor, every person is a human being."⁸⁴ His political rise as a priest was due in part to his ability to mobilize the masses with riveting speeches that seemingly placed the 'good of the people' ahead of everything else.

Aristide took the oath of office on February 7, 1991. Addressing the nation he proclaimed, "It took 200 years to arrive at our second independence. . .at our first independence we cried

⁸²Reportedly, regarded by the United States government as the most suitable figure for the Haitian presidency.

⁸³Aristide, p. 28.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

‘Liberty or Death’! We must now shout with all our strength, ‘Democracy or Death’!’⁸⁵ He immediately went to work on keeping his promises of reform. The first task was to restructure the military, his greatest source of opposition. Aristide called for the retirement of six of the top seven commanders, as well as the retirement of the most brutal rural police chiefs.⁸⁶ The remaining rural police chiefs were stripped of their weapons, and placed under the authority of the Justice Ministry. The new president and his reforms confronted institutions that had always represented the power of wealth, privilege, and violence. Aristide was quickly antagonizing his opposition. For instance, he attacked drug trafficking, and favored raising the daily minimum wage which did not go over well with the military and its elite financial supporters.

Aristide speaks out on the many accusations leveled against him:

I have certainly been accused of being a bad Catholic (priest) or a demagogic politician, one who praises communism. I respond quite simply that Marxism is not a source of inspiration for me. Instead, the texts of Marx constitutes one tool among others to which I may have recourse. To flee from or ignore any philosophy is to prove oneself a cretin. . . I have never measured people by their religious affiliation, but solely—if I have the right to judge—by their behavior. By the same token, I do not consider voodoo to be an antagonist or an enemy of the Christian faith. It is a religion or practice. . . the two [voodoo and Christianity] are complementary in their opposition to evil. . . If [Sigmund] Freud could have sat down with a voodoo priest, I am sure that they would have debated for hours on the complementarity or parallels in their two approaches.⁸⁷

Aristide likens the true *hougan* (voodoo priests) to the psychologist, citing cases where he helped many people with different problems through hypnosis. For instance, on one occasion a

⁸⁵Howard W. French, “Haiti Installs Democratic Chief, Its First,” New York Times, February 8, 1991, Sec. A3.

⁸⁶The rural police chiefs were known as *chefs de section*, and were notorious for their violence and corruption.

⁸⁷Aristide, pp, 69-70.

child, mute for three or four days, had her speech restored when Aristide hypnotized her and addressed the trauma that caused the muteness.⁸⁸

Just a few days prior to his overthrow and subsequent exile, Aristide announced to the General Assembly of the United Nations at New York, September 25, 1991, these ten commandments of democracy in Haiti:

The first commandment of democracy: liberty or death - Haiti was one of the first beacons of liberty in the western hemisphere. . .the cries of "Liberty or death, liberty or death," far from being stifled by a sterile past, have resounded steadily in the heart of a people who have become, forever, a free nation. . .The second commandment of democracy: democracy or death - After having banished the oppressive and corrupt regime of the Duvaliers. . . [Haitians] had only one choice: to install, once and for all, a democratic regime in Haiti. . .The third commandment of democracy: fidelity to human rights - If human beings have duties, they certainly have rights: rights to respect and to be respected. It is, in the last analysis, to guarantee those rights that a just government is established. . .The fourth commandment of democracy: the right to eat and work - . . .The reality of people who are starving because they are exploited is an immediate accusation against the oppressor as well as the authorities who are responsible for seeing that the inalienable and indefeasible rights of life are respected. . .The fifth commandment of democracy: the right to demand what rightfully belongs to us - The contribution of the Haitian people to the democratic struggle that has been set in motion throughout the last five years all over the world is remarkable and exceptional. . .No democratic nation can exist by itself, without weaving geopolitical, diplomatic, economic, and international connections. . .The sixth commandment of democracy: legitimate defense of the diaspora, or tenth department⁸⁹ - Driven out until 1991 by the blind brutality of the repressive machine or by the structures of exploitation erected in an anti-democratic system. . .[Haitians] have not always had the good fortune to find a promised land. . .The seventh commandment of democracy: No to violence, yes to *Lavalas*⁹⁰ - A political revolution without armed force in 1991: is it possible? Yes. Incredible, but true. . .The eighth commandment of democracy: fidelity to the human being, the highest form of wealth - . . .wealth should be at the service

⁸⁸*Ibid*, p. 70.

⁸⁹Aristide refers to Haitians living outside their country.

⁹⁰The Creole term for flood. Aristide's followers called his electoral movement *Lavalas*.

of human beings, the pivot on which the whole politics of *lavalas* turns. . . The suffering of one human being is the suffering of humanity. . . The ninth commandment of democracy: fidelity to our culture - *Lavalas* interlaces the cultural bonds at the very heart of the political universe. . . The tenth commandment of democracy: everyone around the same table - *Yes, everyone around the same democratic table, not a minority on the table, not a majority under the table, but everyone around the same table.* . . Here at the end of the twentieth century, the Republic of Haiti renounces absolutism, embraces participatory democracy, and intones the hymn of liberty, pride, and dignity.⁹¹ For a brief summary of the ten commandments, see Annex C.

As demonstrated above, Aristide has certain strengths, but he also has certain weaknesses that may inhibit democratization in Haiti. Although Aristide's rhetoric is fully pro-democracy, his critics charge him with failure to renounce violence and to seek Haitian conciliation. He seemingly had influence over the masses, yet during his seven month tenure in office (February 7, 1991 - September 30, 1991), he failed to invoke any significant curtailment of the violence, or seek reconciliation of the nation. Aristide's skeptics question the change evident in the president that returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994. Aristide went from a firebrand leftist, who denounced 'U.S. imperialism' and condoned (or did nothing to stop) the use of the *lebrun necklace* (burning opponents to death by setting fire to a tire around their necks) to the Haitian hero, credited with restoring democracy to Haiti (along with the United States).

Not everyone in Haiti has faith in Aristide and his ability to set Haiti on the path to democracy. For instance, Charles David, foreign minister for the Cedras regime, argues that Aristide "knows nothing about administration. He can exploit the problems of this country but he can't solve them."⁹² Moreover, Gregory Brandt, a member of one of Haiti's wealthiest families,

⁹¹Aristide, pp, 189 - 205.

⁹²Linda Robinson and Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Now It's up to Aristide: It Will Take More Than His Charisma to Rebuild a Shattered Haiti," U.S. News & World Report, Vol.

claims that Aristide will incite the poor to attack the rich. According to Brandt, "He's [Aristide's] not interested in unity. Aristide is no [Nelson] Mandela."⁹³

2. Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras (1991 - 1994)



General Cedras, a 46 year old mulatto, is often credited with being the architect of the 1991 coup d'etat. The coup however, began with a mutiny of Sergeants and Corporals that spiraled quickly out of control. Although Aristide proclaimed democracy as Haiti's destiny, the Haitian army proved him wrong, at least from the time of the military coup in September 1991 to the U.S.-led intervention in September 1994. The military leaders who overthrew Aristide were somewhat sensitive to negative world opinion in that they appointed a civilian puppet-president, Joseph Nérette. However, despite this appointment, General Cedras ruled Haiti's three-man military junta from the 1991 coup until October 1994, when he was forced to step down, as a result of last-minute diplomacy and the multinational intervention.

After the coup, the three men running the country were General Cedras, Armed Forces Head; Lieutenant Colonel Michel Francois, Chief of Metropolitan Zone; and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, Chief of Staff. They negotiated terms for the return of the exiled Haitian president. There were protracted negotiations, first by the Organization of American States (OAS), and then by the United Nations (UN), which took over joint UN-OAS negotiations to work out the conditions for Aristide's return. Initially, the principal means utilized initially to pressure the military were

117, p. 52.

⁹³*Ibid.*

economic sanctions, trade cut-off, and oil and arms embargo, none of which were effective. These measures only served to worsen conditions for the Haitian people. The military was able to circumvent these measures, breaking two accord agreements. One accord was signed in February 1992, and the other in July 1993. The military, headed by General Cedras, failed to honor either agreement.

The most important accord was the Governors Island Agreement, signed July 3, 1993, wherein the military leaders in Haiti agreed to step down peacefully, allowing Aristide to resume the presidency. As a result of the failure to honor this agreement, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 917 and 940. Resolution 917 established economic sanctions not to be lifted completely until the three top junta members stepped down and the President and constitutional order were restored. Resolution 940 authorized a multinational force to use "all necessary means" to restore the President and a stable government, and to carry out the tenets of the Governors Island accord.⁹⁴

During Cedras's military regime, there were various acts of violence. Well over 2,000 people were murdered, and more than 20,000 went into exile, fleeing repression. Many thousands were also in hiding.⁹⁵ In a televised address to the nation, President William Clinton gave his rationale for invading Haiti. He painted a gruesome picture of the inhumanity displayed by the military regime: "Cedras and his thugs have conducted a reign of terror, executing children, raping women, and killing priests. As the dictators have grown more desperate, the atrocities have grown

⁹⁴"Diplomacy: Paving the Way," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A5.

⁹⁵Aristide, p. 164.

ever more brutal.”⁹⁶ After the September 1994 U.S.-led intervention, Cedras went into exile in Panama, prior to the return of President Aristide. Table 3 helps to point out the extent of the cost Haiti suffered under the Cedras military regime.

Table 3: Cost of a Coup d’Etat

COST OF A COUP: HAITI, SEPTEMBER 1991 TO NOVEMBER 1993	
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	15% Decline
Manufacturing Sector	Lost 25,000 of its 80,000 Jobs
Exports to the United States	63% Decline
Imports from the United States	62% Decline

Source: “Anti-Aristide Camp Moves a ‘Solution:’ Cost of a Coup,” Latin American Weekly Report, WR-93-43, 4 November 1993, p. 506.

Although the purpose of this paper is not to address the rationale for invading Haiti, brief comments concerning the skepticism and the support for such action are warranted. At the time of President Clinton’s address to the nation, the polls indicated that two-thirds of the electorate, including both Democrats and Republicans opposed any military action. A Time/CNN poll taken after the President’s speech showed that 58 percent of the American population were opposed and 27 percent were in favor of a U.S. invasion.

Blending elements of the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine, Mr. Clinton argued that if General Cedras refuses to yield power, the United States would have no choice but to invade to protect its interests, ‘to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders, and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our

⁹⁶Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Addresses Nation on Threat to Invade Haiti; Tells Dictators to Get Out: ‘Your Time is Up,’” New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A4, Col. 1.

hemisphere, and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us.⁹⁷

President Clinton explained how General Cedras, during his three-year junta rule, rejected every peaceful solution that the international community proposed, failing to honor any commitments made. Two hundred years after the Haitian people rose up and declared their freedom, they have continually had their freedom repressed. As pointed out by President Clinton, of the 35 countries in the Americas hemisphere, Haiti is the only one where the people elected their own government and chose democracy, only to have dictators take that freedom away. According to the President, restoring democracy in Haiti would lead to more stability and prosperity in the region, as did U.S. actions in Panama and Grenada.⁹⁸

President Clinton had some congressional support. For instance, Democratic Representative John Coyers, the senior member of the Congressional Black Caucus, pointed out that "all other alternatives have failed, while the repression, torture, and anti-democratic activities have continued."⁹⁹ Democrat and member of the Black Caucus, Representative Maxine Waters expressed complete support for the President's attempt to "stop the killing, secure our own borders, and restore democracy to our neighbor."¹⁰⁰ Finally, Representative Joseph Kennedy II (Democrat) said that "we

⁹⁷R. W. Apple Jr., "Clinton Addresses Nation on Threat to Invade Haiti; Tells Dictators to Get Out: Preaching to Skeptics," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A1.

⁹⁸R. W. Apple Jr., "In the Words of the President: The Reasons Why We May Invade Haiti," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A4.

⁹⁹Katharine Q. Seelye, "Few Opinions, Pro or Con, Seem to Change in Congress," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A5.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*

have important interests in ending the reign of terror that has killed, tortured, and maimed thousands of innocent people and sent tens of thousands of refugees to our shores.”¹⁰¹

There were many, however, who did not agree with the President. The skeptics did not believe that invading Haiti was actually in the United States’ best interest. For instance, Senator Bob Dole (Republican) stated, “the President did not make a convincing case that an invasion to return Aristide to power is worth the risk of any American lives.”¹⁰² Senator John McCain (Republican) said, “It’s a lesson of the Vietnam War we cannot forget, which is: we cannot involve ourselves militarily without the support of the American people.”¹⁰³ Representative David Skaggs (Democrat) stated, “there’s just a gut-level sense in this country that the interests of the United States in this matter are not serious enough to justify the use of our military.”¹⁰⁴

In response to the lack of support for his decision to order an invasion of Haiti, President Clinton declared,

I know many people believe that we shouldn’t help the Haitian people recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedom, that the Haitians should accept the violence and repression as their fate. But remember, the same was said of a people who more than 200 years ago took up arms against a tyrant whose forces occupied their land. But they were a stubborn bunch, a people who fought for their freedoms and appealed to all those who believed in democracy to help their cause. And their cries were answered. And a new nation

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*

was born, a nation that ever since has believed that the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none.¹⁰⁵

Despite the unpopularity of his choice, President Clinton made the decision to intervene in Haiti, which may have been the sole remaining option that would influence the Haitian dictators. Three years of diplomacy failed to oust the Haitian military and restore Aristide to the presidency. As President Clinton viewed the situation, an invasion was simply the right thing to do. Haiti is close to the United States, and the proposed mission was clearly achievable and limited. Clinton compared the mission in Haiti to those in Panama and Grenada: limited and specific. There was a two-stage plan: first, to remove the dictators from power, restoring order and the legitimate, democratic government; second, after restoration of order and stability, the UN multinational force, including some U.S. troops, would remain until Aristide's succession (February 1996) after the next presidential elections scheduled for December 1995.

B. TRANSITION PHASE

The argument here is that without the support of the United States, hopes for democratization in Haiti would remain shattered. Moreover, the need for an external actor, especially the United States, is suggested because of Haiti's lack of experience with democracy. The Haitian peoples' desire for democracy was demonstrated by their election of Aristide in 1990. However, despite the efforts of the Haitian people and their democratically elected president, the country was unable to cling to democracy. This was due, in keeping with Haitian tradition, to the Haitian military's assumption of the right to govern the country.

¹⁰⁵R. W. Apple Jr., "In the Words of the President: The Reasons Why We May Invade Haiti," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A4.

The United States embarked on Operation Uphold Democracy on September 19, 1994, with promoting democracy as one of the main objectives of U.S. foreign policy. American troops entered Haiti as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 940.

The MNF's mandate is: to use all necessary means to secure the departure of the coup leaders; restore the legitimate, democratically-elected Government of Haiti to power; and create a secure and stable environment that will allow the Haitian people to assume responsibility for rebuilding their country. In less than one month, the MNF succeeded in achieving its first two objectives, and in January [1995], reported to the UN Security Council that a secure and stable environment had been established setting the stage for transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).¹⁰⁶

1. U.S. Intervention (September 1994 - September 1995)

Operation Uphold Democracy is not the first time the United States has intervened in Haiti. In 1915, the United States Marines occupied Haiti due to widespread civil unrest and instability and American business interests. American troops stayed in Haiti from 1915 until 1934, leaving the Haitian military as the most powerful institution in the country. Haiti did not democratize after the American troops left. Instead, the military resumed its traditional dictatorial role of governing the country.

The weekend of September 18, 1994, a last-minute U.S. diplomatic delegation, consisting of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat);¹⁰⁷ and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, arrived in Haiti to negotiate a peaceful end to the situation in Haiti, and avoid a full-scale U.S. invasion. The delegation worked out an accord with Lieutenant

¹⁰⁶U. S. President, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," February 1, 1995, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷Sam Nunn was also the head of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

General Cedras of the Haitian military, Emile Jonassaint, the Haitian military's illegitimate president, and General Biamby. Under this agreement the de facto military rulers, Cedras and Biamby agreed to step down, voluntarily, with the passing of an amnesty law by the Haitian parliament. Although not an official part of the agreement, the generals indicated they would leave Haiti by October 15, 1994. The third member of the military junta, General Francois, had already fled the country to neighboring Dominica.

With the peace accord in place, the imminent U.S. invasion was turned into an international peacekeeping mission of 25 coalition nations. Their mission was to restore Haiti's democratic government under the terms of UN Security Resolution 940.¹⁰⁸

Operation Uphold Democracy rolled into full-swing as American troops immobilized the Haitian Army and cracked down on Haiti's infamous paramilitary groups. This operation primarily involved peacemaking and stabilization in Haiti. A contingent of marines, deployed on amphibious ships stationed off the Haitian coast, were the first to land in Haiti. Their primary goal was to restore order. The marines' immediate mission was to take control of the Haitian police, assuming the interim task of disarming paramilitary groups and the general public. The majority of the troops who arrived next were from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division. They replaced the first contingent of troops, the 1,900 or so U.S. Marines. The light infantrymen of the 10th Mountain Division quickly found themselves in the middle of Haitian street violence. A particularly violent club-beating incident by the Haitian army's Heavy Weapons Company,¹⁰⁹ where they beat at least

¹⁰⁸Douglass Jehl, "Haitian Military Rulers Agree to Leave; Clinton Halts Assault, Recalls 61 Planes," New York Times, September 19, 1994, Sec. A4.

¹⁰⁹The Haitian Army's Heavy Weapons Co. were notorious for their violent acts, playing a key role in almost every recent military coup in Haiti, including Aristide's.

two pro-American demonstrators to death in sight of the 10th Mountain Division, sparked immediate reaction by Defense Secretary William Perry. Perry quickly sent in 1,000 Military Police, and changed the rules of engagement to allow American troops to use deadly force to keep the peace.

To a large degree, if not completely, the Haitian Army's Heavy Weapons Company was disarmed and dismantled by the U.S. military, which was seen by many Haitians as the first move toward the eventual reform of the entire Haitian Armed Forces. The 10th Mountain Division was relieved, January 30, 1995 by the 25th Infantry Division. In addition to the major U.S. unit, the 25th Infantry, there are several other units participating in Operation Uphold Democracy. Table 4 shows the participating units.

Table 4: Operation Uphold Democracy: Participating Forces

UNITS PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY			
U.S. Units in the Multinational Force (MNF)	Non-U.S. Units in the MNF	Nations contributing to International Police Monitors (IPMs)	
Joint Task Force 190	Bangladesh	Argentina	Australia
25th Infantry (Light)	Barbados	Bangladesh	Barbados
3rd Squadron, 2d	Dominica	Belgium	Benin
Armored Cavalry Regiment	Grenada	Bolivia	Denmark
25th Military Police Battalion	Guatemala	Dominica	Grenada
65th Engineer Battalion	Philippines	Guyana	Israel
47th Field Hospital	Nepal	Jordan	Netherlands
3d Special Forces Group	St. Kitts	Philippines	Poland
4th Psychological Operations Group	St. Lucia	St. Kitts	St. Lucia
Joint Logistics Support Command		St. Vincent	

Source: "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti, February 1, 1995," U. S. Department of State.

2. Transfer of Power/Return of Aristide (October 15, 1994)

By October 15, 1994, the road was clear for President Aristide's return. Within one week the military leaders were out of the picture. On 4 October, Francois went into exile in the Dominican Republic. On 9 October, Biamby resigned. On 10 October, Cedras announced his resignation and that he was leaving the country. Both Cedras and Biamby were exiled to Panama. In the interim, General Jean-Claude Duperval took over from General Cedras as commander of Haiti's army. Aristide had appointed Duperval, in December 1993, as part of the failed accord with General Cedras.

With the assistance of the United States, Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994 after three years in exile. He is faced with the enormous task of rebuilding his country, after another round of plundering by the military. Raymond Kelly, former New York Police Commissioner, was put in charge of rebuilding the Haitian police force into a viable institution, capable of taking over from the U.S. troops.

Aristide's return received a joyous welcome from his supporters. However, the situation in Haiti was anything but peaceful. Aristide returned amidst vandalism, looting, violence, and revenge attempts. According to Linda Robinson and Richard Chesnoff, it will take more than charisma to rebuild Haiti. Aristide must resolve "problems exacerbated by the military government such as poverty, a weak economy, and inefficient or corrupt officials [and institutions]." ¹¹⁰

In some of his first steps, Aristide named a new prime minister, Smarck Michel, along with other cabinet members. The goal was to implement new plans and programs immediately, including

¹¹⁰Linda Robinson and Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Now It's up to Aristide: It Will Take More Than His Charisma to Rebuild a Shattered Haiti," U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 117, p. 51.

the creation of an efficient, decentralized government that works for and with all citizens; replacing the departed coup leader; and passing legislature to create an independent judiciary.

In Aristide's own words (French, Creole, and English), "Today [October 15, 1994] the light of democracy burns brightly in Haiti. It illuminates our nation's promise and potential to become a full partner in the community of nations. Many times during our three-year national nightmare, the light of democracy flickered and grew dim. But that light did not fail."¹¹¹ Aristide threw a dove of peace into the air as he delivered his message of non-violence and non-vengefulness, calling for Haitian reconciliation.

The most pressing concerns for the newly-returned president are countering political instability, dealing with a militarized population, rebuilding an abused nation, and reconciling its society. Aristide has made great strides in his initial efforts, but when the operation was turned over to the UNMIH along with a departure of a majority of the U.S. troops on March 31, 1995, the immediate question was; will democratic transition continue, ultimately ending in a consolidated democracy in Haiti?

3. U.S. Pullout/Transfer to U.N. Force (March 31, 1995)

In the United States' effort to provide support for the establishment of democracy in Haiti, what is more effective: unilateralism or multilateralism? More specifically, just how important is the role of the United States?

In January 1995, the UN Security Council declared a secure and stable environment in Haiti, starting the process of transition to the UNMIH that would replace the U.S. operation. Although the

¹¹¹Jean-Bertrand Aristide, "Haiti Emerges, Eyes Blinking, In the Sunlight of Democracy," New York Times, October 16, 1994.

United States did not pull out completely, the Haitians were afraid of what the transfer to a UN force might mean for democracy in their country. Most Haitian officials would have preferred that the United States maintain a dominant military presence until after the parliamentary elections held in June and September 1995, and the presidential elections scheduled for December 1995. Haitians were worried that the UNMIH would not be equal to the challenge of providing a show of force in support of democracy. Many Haitians expressed their fears, as reported by Larry Rohter,

‘We know that the American soldiers are men of war, more ferocious than the men who will replace them,’ said Emmanuel Boisron, a peasant farmer who lives in the Artibonite Valley and credits the arrival of the Americans with driving the *Tontons Macoute* and other paramilitary groups underground. ‘A lot of the *macoutes* think that too, that they will be able to come back stronger when the Americans leave.’¹¹²

The UN force is restricted by narrower rules of engagement. In other words, U.S. troops had more flexibility in determining the use of weapons, depending upon individual situations. In contrast, the UN forces fall under stricter rules of engagement and are viewed by Haitians as weaker, in terms of ability to quell the violence/vengeance of paramilitary groups. The UNMIH seemingly does not project the same level of power as the U.S. forces, the concern being, will the UNMIH be able to maintain a stable and secure environment in Haiti? How will the U.S. troops respond to possible threats under their new rules of engagement, as members of the UN force? The UN force may not have the reputation of the U.S. troops, but they do have the membership of approximately 2,500 U.S. troops. Assisted by the UN forces, Aristide has been able to maintain peace while disbanding the army and driving factions (still heavily armed) underground. The United

¹¹²Larry Rohter, “Haiti Uneasy Over Pullout By the U.S.:G.I.’s Yet to Finish Job Many Say,” New York Times, January 27, 1995, Sec. A5.

States transfer of the Haiti operation to the UNMIH has seemingly been a success. The presence of the UNMIH troops played an important role in the peaceful elections held in June and September 1995. Even if the peace is solely contributed to imposition by UNMIH troops, it is still significant that the troops were not called on to prevent any violence.

C. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE THREE MAJOR THEORETICAL VARIABLES

(1986 - SEPTEMBER 1995)

The analysis will discern which, if any of the three variables are the most salient, and whether the means and methods of transition to democracy make a difference. Should one variable come before the others, or does order matter? The United States cannot compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings, but the United States can provide assistance and support in establishing a foundation on which to build positive relations between the Haitian civilian government and its military, as well as viable political institutions. While U.S. assistance is vital, the United States cannot export democracy without Haiti's readiness for the transition. By and large, a country must make the transition and consolidate democracy from within. There must be some form of preconditions, such as the 1990 elections in Haiti and an attempt at some form of democratic government.

1. Civil-Military Relations

Scholars have posited many theories on the most effective method of achieving civilian control without weakening the continuing basis of national security. Huntington argues that "the one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the military, by rendering

them politically sterile and neutral.”¹¹³ Stepan, Laguerre, and Gillespie argue that if there is a balanced relationship between civil society and the military, where civil society exercises legitimate control over the military, then such a relationship is conducive to democratic development.¹¹⁴

Aristide immediately resumed the reforms he began in 1991, his primary goal being “to return the army to its role as protector of the country and to suppress the last of the paramilitary groups allied with the mafia.”¹¹⁵ Reforming the military was one of the most significant, if not the deciding factor in the coup that ousted Aristide. Aristide and his supporters were defenseless against the Haitian military and its supporters. Military members were interested in preserving their prerogatives, and with a legitimate but powerless president, they could not be stopped. With the U.S. intervention providing the window of opportunity, Aristide turned his attention to the nature of civil-military relations. Because of the history of the Haitian military, instead of attempting to enforce civilian control over the military, President Aristide has opted to disband the Haitian military.

The primary focus is on establishing a viable police force, distinct from the military. To this end, retraining courses for former military members and civilian volunteers resumed on January 17, 1995. The Interim Public Security Force is being trained and guided by International Police Monitors, and the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

¹¹³Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 84.

¹¹⁴Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Gillespie, “Democratic Consolidation in South America,” Third World Quarterly April 1989; Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1993).

¹¹⁵Aristide, p. 136.

Program (ICITAP)¹¹⁶ is assisting the Haitian Government in establishing and training the new professional civilian police force. The new National Police Academy that opened on February 7, 1995 will train the permanent professional police force.

One significant element to Aristide's initial plans to achieve, then maintain civilian control over the military, was his attempt to extend peace and opportunity to former military members. These former military members are undoubtedly afraid of retribution, but Aristide has allayed these fears to some degree by offering employment options to demobilized military members. The two options open to former military members were to participate in a free course of accelerated technical and professional training, or obtain a job with one of the ministries, such as Agriculture, Health or Public Works.

Aristide began by discharging military officers of the old guard. In an expedient move to regain control over the military, Aristide dismissed the interim commander, Duperval on November 17, 1994. Aristide then appointed a new interim commander in chief of the Haitian Armed Forces: Brigadier General Bernadin Poisson. According to Poisson, "the significance of this appointment is that the government wants to change the image of the army."¹¹⁷ As Army Commander, Poisson announced the appointment of a new army High Command on November 19, 1994.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ICITAP has the benefit of recent experience in this field. After the 1989 U.S. invasion, it helped set up Panama's new *Fuerza Publica*, mainly with former members of General Noriega's defense forces. "Difficult Transition Gets Under Way," Latin American Weekly, WR-94-40, 20 October 1994, p. 470.

¹¹⁷"Aristide Removes Army Commander," Latin American Weekly Report, WR-94-46, 1 December 1994, p. 544.

¹¹⁸"Army Commander Appoints New High Command," Paris AFP in Spanish 1633 GMT, November 19, 1994, Translated by FBIS.

Parts of the Haitian constitution that have never been adhered to are being dealt with, such as exerting civilian control over the military. This has never been effectively accomplished to the benefit of the Haitian people. Francois Duvalier did gain control of the military but only to the extent that it served his dictatorial purposes. Aristide's decision to disband the Haitian military is a popular one among Haitians.

On February 21, 1995, Aristide originally attempted to gain control of the military. He purged the Haitian military, dismissing most of the senior officer corps, including the interim military commander-in-chief Poisson. The Minister of Defense, General Wilthian Lherisson, authorized financial compensation, to be paid to the forced retirees upon surrender of all weapons in their possession or under their command. Aristide reduced the military from more than 7,000 soldiers to about 1,500.¹¹⁹ He now has a new, well-trained police force, under the guidance of Ray Kelly (former New York City Police Chief). This new police force is separate from the military, with members recruited from former political refugees and other enemies of the former dictatorship.

As noted by Stepan, "a basic aspect of civil-military relations is the potential tension that exists between the civilian political rulers' need to maintain an armed force as an instrument of foreign policy and internal order, and their need to ensure that military power does not usurp political power."¹²⁰ If President Aristide has his way, Haiti will not have to deal with a politicized military. He has stated that his number one priority is ensuring that "the army doesn't exist

¹¹⁹Larry Rohter, "Army Leaders Forced Out By Aristide," New York Times, February 22, 1995, Sec. A5.

¹²⁰Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 57.

anymore,¹²¹ which, considering Haiti's history of politicized armed forces, might be the solution for Haiti. Aristide's abolition of the 7,000-man army in favor of a newly trained 5,000 member national police force is the most important step in Haiti's democratic transition. There has been no modern tradition of a balance between civil-military relations, nor is there a foundation upon which to build viable institutions such as a political party system, a legislature, or a judiciary.

2. Strength of Political Institutions

Aristide also turned his attention to key political institutions. Traditionally, Haitian political institutions have had little, if any semblance of democratic governing. There was evidence in 1987 of the Haitian desire for effective and legitimate institutions. For example, along with the new 1987 constitution, a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was created. The CEP was made up of representatives of democratic organizations. However, it was curtailed by the National Council of Government (CNG), which was headed by the military.¹²² Judicial processes and a properly functioning police force are essential to deter violence and expedite justice.

The inability of the majority of the population (85%) to read or write can be a drawback to electoral participation and the development of political parties. In 1990, Aristide and his supporters nevertheless mobilized the masses to vote. In order to facilitate voting for illiterates, there were symbols on the ballots, representing the candidates. The presence of educated masses does not necessarily lead to democratic development. Cuba is a good example: although under Fidel Castro,

¹²¹President Aristide's Internet Interview, American On-Line, July 5, 1995.

¹²²Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Dominican Republic and Haiti Country Studies (Headquarters, Department of the Army: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 328.

Cuba has a high literacy rate of 98.5% (according to U.S. Department of State's 1990 Background Notes), literacy has not made Cuba a democracy.

As noted by Aristide, "politics cannot be conducted without mutual respect between the legislature and the executive."¹²³ On November 4, 1994, Aristide met with more than 60 senators and deputies from different political affiliations to discuss the national reconciliation process. He noted the Parliament's importance to a democratic system and addressed upcoming legislative elections. Aristide seems totally committed to building viable institutions. Thus far he has received support from many former opponents. For example, "Rita Frederic Moncoeur, of the Union for National Reconciliation, who opposed President Aristide's return to Haiti, hailed President Aristide's initiative[s]."¹²⁴ Reform programs include initiatives to decentralize the administration of justice and government, placing a number of services under departmental and municipal control, privatization of state-owned companies, and a comprehensive review of penal, civil, and commercial legislation.

According to Amy Wilentz, "Nowhere in Haiti is the lack of democratic institutions more obvious or more important than in the judicial system."¹²⁵ She points out that without the ability to seek institutional justice, Haitians are likely to continue to take matters of justice into their own hands. Armed with international backing and support, Aristide has the opportunity to create for the first time in Haitian history a government that works, one that includes a properly functioning justice

¹²³Aristide, p. 162.

¹²⁴"Aristide Meets Legislators on Elections 4 Nov," Port-Au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT November 4, 1994, Translated by FBIS, 7 Nov 94, p. 15.

¹²⁵Amy Wilentz, "After the Jubilation, Aristide Faces Hard Job of Governing," Los Angeles Times, October 16, 1994, p. 232.

system and a viable police force. There is some evidence of progress toward stronger political institutions. As reported in President Clinton's report to Congress, "a project to resurrect Haiti's moribund judicial system, involving in its first stage the training of justices of the peace, was launched by the U.S. Administration of Justice programs on January 17, [1995] in cooperation with the Haitian Justice Ministry."¹²⁶ In one landmark case, one of several alleged authors of the assassination of industrialist Antoine Izmyer, a democratic activist who was murdered in front of the Sacred Heart Church on September 11, 1993, the attache Gerard Gustave, alias Zimbabwe, was recently tried and convicted on charges of premeditated murder, conspiracy, and assassination. On August 25, 1995, he was sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, Emmanuel Constant, leader of the paramilitary organization accused of perpetrating thousands of crimes during the military regime, appeared in federal court in chains on August 25, 1995 in Baltimore, Maryland. Constant was being tried for deportation, as the U.S. State Department had revoked his visa. A warrant for Constant's arrest is pending in Haiti, where he faces charges of assassination, rape, kidnaping and torture. The Haitian government has filed for Constant's extradition to Haiti. Constant's return to Haiti is widely viewed by the Haitian people as a fundamental step towards accountability and justice.

In order to complete the transition to democracy it is essential that Aristide rid Haiti of the anti-democratic elements that for so long have been entrenched in the country's political system. Since President Aristide's return, not only has he been able to begin the difficult task of depoliticizing and reforming Haiti's armed forces but the Haitian Parliament is in session as well,

¹²⁶U. S. President, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," February 1, 1995, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, p. 5.

and prospects for the upcoming presidential election are promising. The Haitian Parliament has again committed itself to ensuring a free and fair presidential election. However, as pointed out by Alain Rouquié, “while it is easy to call elections, it is more difficult to govern after many years of destructive military rule. . .”¹²⁷ In fact, a draft electoral law, approved by the Haitian Parliament, makes provisions for establishing departmental and communal electoral councils, delineation of electoral districts, the eligibility and registration of candidates, the establishment of registration offices and polling places, and voter eligibility and registration.¹²⁸

Despite the reservations, observed in many Haitians, parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for May, were successfully held on June 25, 1995. Observers reported confusion and foul-ups at the polls, but little violence. As reported in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, tens of thousands of Haitians voted in a confused but relatively peaceful first election since 20,000 U.S. military personnel restored President Aristide to power on October 15, 1994.¹²⁹ Makeup parliamentary elections were postponed until August 13 and 21, 1995 because of protests, by political parties, of administrative problems in the first round of voting. Aristide has come under attack for the parliamentary elections held in June with runoffs in September 1995. The Lavalas Party won the June vote by a landslide, taking 67 of the 83 seats in the lower house. Opposition parties criticized the election, claiming widespread irregularities. For instance, some polls opened

¹²⁷Alain Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1977), p. 394.

¹²⁸U. S. President, “Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti,” February 1, 1995, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, p. 6.

¹²⁹“Haitians Vote Amid Peaceful Confusion,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 26, 1995. p 1.

late or not at all, candidates name were left off some ballots, and voter's names were missing from registration lists.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, international observers' consensus supported the validity of the elections.

When Haiti attempted to hold elections in 1987, army-backed death squads attacked voters with guns and machetes. As for the 1990 presidential election, the Haitian army's September 1991 coup d'etat deposed the elected president. Aristide's optimism runs high. He noted that, "we didn't have any tradition of organizing elections. If we can organize in three months three elections, that means a lot for my country. . . this is paving the way to keep moving ahead toward democracy."¹³¹ Moreover, Aristide rejects suggestions that Haiti is headed toward one-party rule. He stated, "because we mean what we say in terms of building a state of law, we need a minority as we need a majority, we need the leaders of the opposition as we need those who support our government, we need the rich as we need the poor."¹³² According to analysts, the opposition must regroup after the overwhelming majority won by the Aristide supported Lavalas party, and prior to the presidential election, scheduled for December 1995, if it is to regain credibility as a viable political force.

3. U.S. Assistance/Support for Democracy

Few people dispute the value of democracies. According to democratic peace theory, democracies make good trading partners, they generally do not go to war with each other, and they

¹³⁰"Aristide Backers Dominate Election Round," New York Times, August 22, 1995, Sec. A3.

¹³¹Sandra Marquez, "Democracy Emerging in Haiti, Aristide Says," Reuter, September 18, 1995. AOL.

¹³²*Ibid.*

tend to avoid human rights abuses. Moreover, without the violence and repression, citizens tend to migrate less. It is thus no surprise that promoting democracy remains at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. As history has seemingly demonstrated, the spread of democracy leads to greater world peace and cooperation.¹³³

U.S. presence has had a great impact on democratization in such cases as Haiti, Panama, and Grenada. For the United States, it may be preferable to promote democracy via multilateralism. The assistance of the United Nations and other countries relieves the United States of bearing the heavy burden unilaterally. The United States, still the most powerful nation, and champion of the principles of democracy, has the responsibility as the world's leader to support and encourage worldwide support for fledgling democracies. The U.S. influence can be so great (especially economic influence) that the United States is bound to positively influence democratic development in nations such as Haiti, Panama, and Grenada.

In terms of analyzing the U.S. role, Jorge Castaneda asserts that the key element to consider was the alternative: "Without such intervention, the disintegration of Haitian society seemed unavoidable."¹³⁴ Castaneda argues that forced removal of the dictatorship was the only way to end the violence against the Haitian people.

¹³³Democratic Peace Theory literature includes: John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace" in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 87; David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War" in American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-36; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace" in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 5-49; and Mark Peceny, "The Inter-American System as a Liberal 'Pacific Union'?" in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1994), pp. 188-201.

¹³⁴Jorge Castaneda, "Finally, the Hemisphere Sees a Just U.S. Intervention: Haiti," Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1994, p. 235.

Certainly Aristide was elected by a broad coalition of supporters (*lavalas*) as the Haitian President. However, it was the presence of American troops that allowed him to reclaim his democratic right to rule. As in other Latin American countries, the armed forces have been the single most serious impediment to the development of democracy in Haiti. Due to the success of Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti enjoys a level of security that it has not witnessed for a very long time.

The argument that history shapes the future is evidenced by Haiti's turbulent history. The coup d'état against Aristide was only the most recent in a long sequence of such interventions, but the mere fact that Aristide was democratically elected is proof that the Haitian people were tired of living under dictatorial rule. There has been this evidence of democratic progress or what some theorists may posit as liberalization¹³⁵ in Haiti since the popular movement to oust Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986. Haitian civil society—the would-be liberalizers, have not had the power or means to guarantee a transition to democracy. The United States, along with the UN multinational coalition, have played a critical role in helping Haiti transition to democracy. The peaceful occupation and strong, consistent support for democracy have allowed Haitians the time needed for rebuilding the infrastructure. With the security and stability provided by the multinational force, President Aristide has been able to implement his reforms, and start the process of institution-building.

¹³⁵Described as a 'political opening' by Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transition," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues of Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 105-152.

The United States played a major role in Haiti's efforts to transition to democracy. Using the plausible "paths" as described by Stepan,¹³⁶ externally-monitored installation comes the closest. Similar to what was seen in Panama and Grenada, the United States and its coalition force used intervention, albeit peaceful in Haiti, to overcome the ruling military juntas. As a result of this action, Haiti is once again evolving toward a democratic system that has the long-term potential of consolidation. According to Cole Blasier, the U.S. operation in Haiti was more successful than those in Panama and Grenada in that it involved neither armed conflict nor loss of life. He points out that the removal of a dictator or the holding of a free election does not signal the achievement of democracy, rather, such actions are only first steps.¹³⁷ U.S. assistance and support for democracy enabled Haiti to make significant advances in nurturing the democratic process and building sustainable institutions. Moreover, since the U.S.-led intervention, one year ago, human rights conditions have improved drastically.

D. SUMMARY

The analysis in this chapter supports the assertion that U.S. support is a necessary but insufficient condition for democratization in Haiti. While U.S. assistance is vital, the United States cannot export democracy without Haiti's participation. By and large, Haiti must democratize "from within." Without the support and assistance of the United States, Haiti would still be struggling under military dictatorship. For three years, there were ongoing efforts to restore Aristide, including

¹³⁶Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, pp 64-84.

¹³⁷Blasier, "Dilemmas in Promoting Democracy: Lessons from Grenada, Panama, and Haiti," North-South Issues: Democracy, Vol. IV, No.4, 1994, p. 6.

sanctions, none of which succeeded in ousting the military and restoring Aristide. Seemingly, the military juntas only ceded power when they realized that President Clinton had actually ordered an invasion, proving that he had no qualms in carrying it out. U.S. intervention and continued support for democracy have provided Haiti with the time it needs as it begins to rebuild and reform key institutions, and gain civilian control over the military.

Given the departure of U.S. troops on March 31, 1995, the parliamentary elections held on June 25, 1995 with run-off elections held on September 17, 1995, this thesis argues that a likely scenario is one of democratic transition and eventual consolidation in Haiti, despite its turbulent history. Although a great deal remains to be done in Haiti, having achieved the key objective, the MNF reports a successful operation to date. The assistance provided by the MNF resulted in the "ejection of the military coup leaders, and the restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti, and the establishment of a secure and stable environment that will allow for the transition to UNMIH."¹³⁸ With this type of support, the Haitians can now make great strides in the effort to rebuild vital institutions (political, military, social, and economic).

Since the U.S.-led intervention, Haiti has enjoyed a number of positive changes and improved conditions. Encouraging evidence includes: a decrease in reported human rights abuses; less Haitians attempting to flee their country; overhaul of the judicial system; detentions and arrests that are now only carried out with a warrant, except in cases where offenders are caught in the act of committing flagrant offenses; new measures to assure respect for the fundamental rights of prisoners and to improve prison conditions; and the creation of the National Commission for Truth

¹³⁸U. S. President, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," February 1, 1995, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, p. 9.

and Justice, the mandate of which consists of publicizing the truth about violations and crimes committed during the military dictatorship and assigning responsibility for them. In addition, Aristide's efforts toward a more accountable and effective state include taxing the wealthy as well as the poor. Amid grave failures in collecting taxes as required by Haitian law, the General Director of the National Tax Administration was replaced by Cleferne Prevert. Aristide noted that "economic reconciliation begins in this institution. . . . While in most societies taxation is used to gather revenues for social and other national needs, in Haiti taxation has historically been used to transfer wealth from the poor to the wealthy—the wealthy and large businesses traditionally have paid no taxes, while the poor have been heavily taxed."¹³⁹ Creating a functional system of taxation is one of the fundamental challenges of democratization.

As reported by Michael S. Serrill, "the press is free, political parties are vigorous and human rights abuses are at a historic low."¹⁴⁰ Moreover, with the support of foreign advisers, Aristide has taken steps to make a broken and bankrupt nation viable again. The Haitian economy is growing at a healthy pace of 4.5 percent a year. The inflation rate stands at 25 percent less than half the level in September 1994. Some factories and other businesses have also reopened.¹⁴¹ Despite its successes in the one year since U.S. intervention, Haiti faces major challenges in the quest for democracy. Uppermost in the minds of many, is that the immensely popular Aristide must step down after his replacement is elected in December elections. According to Douglas Farah, the only person who now seems determined to see Aristide leave on schedule is Aristide himself. Even

¹³⁹Haiti Update from Internet: Haiti Home page, September 13, 1995.

¹⁴⁰Serrill, "Haiti Rising from Ruin," Time, October 16, 1995, p. 87.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*

though Aristide is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term in the next election, there is a growing clamor for him to stay. It is no longer just the masses. Leading families of the elite, who long viewed Aristide with distrust, now view him as a stabilizing force. According to U.S. National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, Aristide advisers, and Aristide himself, Aristide plans to step down as pledged.¹⁴² The primary fear is the identity of Aristide's successor, and that the new president will rule without international supervision. On the heels of the presidential election, the UNMIH with its 7,000 troop contingent is scheduled to pull out in February 1996. The newly-trained Haitian police force must take over the preservation of law and order in a Haitian society that remains plagued by discontent and political violence. Moreover, the process of privatizing Haiti's inefficient and money-losing state-owned companies continues to challenge Aristide, and will challenge his successor as well.

¹⁴²Farah, "Aristide Willing to Quit, but Many Want Him to Stay," The Washington Post, October 1, 1995, Sect A32.

V. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is substantial debate on the role and effectiveness of external actors versus internal actors in the promotion and protection of democracy. With the end of the Cold War, the United States has become increasingly supportive of democratic movements and institutions throughout the world. Generally considered the most important external actor in Latin America, the United States has proved itself a significant actor in Haitian affairs. However, as noted by Lowenthal, the impact of U.S. policy on Latin American democracy was usually negligible, and only occasionally positive.¹⁴³ What does U.S. policy toward Haiti imply for future U.S. foreign policy—more specifically, U.S. foreign policy in terms of fledgling democracies requiring U.S. assistance/support? Should intervention be limited to Latin America or should other regions of the world be included?

The first step in assessing U.S. policy toward Haiti is to analyze the causes, scope, and significance of changes in the region. There have been unquestionable changes taking place in Latin America during the past few years: an emerging consensus among economic policy makers on the main tenets of sound policy; the even more universal embrace of constitutional democracy as an ideal; and a growing disposition toward pragmatic cooperation with the United States. Thomas Carothers argues that external actors, even powerful ones like the United States, are limited in their ability to affect a country's political process.¹⁴⁴ He gives more credit to the weight of history, culture, and the independent actions of indigenous forces.

¹⁴³Lowenthal, p. 243.

¹⁴⁴Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 261.

Promoting democracy worldwide, protecting national security interests, and expanding trade are the three pillars of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. The Clinton Administration's foreign policy agenda seeks to promote democracy, as seen in the establishment of a U.S. government Inter-Agency Working Group on Democracy and Human Rights; proposal of Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act; and the promotion of democracy in countries as diverse as Haiti and South Africa. Despite such efforts, a hemispheric political community, in favor of democracy, is far from achieved. Lowenthal noted that agreement in principle within the OAS on collective measures to protect democracy, although a notable achievement, has been difficult to put into practice in Haiti and Peru amid disagreement about whether, how, and for how long to impose sanctions.¹⁴⁵

In much of Latin America, there is continuing wariness about possible U.S. intervention—now no longer justified by anti-communism but motivated instead by human rights, democracy, drugs, environmental degradation, or the proliferation of deadly weapons. The irony is that without external assistance from key players like the United States, democracy in countries like Haiti would not be possible. For three years Haiti struggled to rid itself of its military rulers but to no avail. It was only with the reality of the U.S.-led military intervention that Haitian Army Commander in Chief, General Raoul Cedras agreed to step down.

The U.S.-led military intervention has led to a less turbulent, more secure and stable environment in Haiti. However, much of the endemic violence and terror remain. The key to continued success of the UNMIH will be in the assistance provided to Haiti in training a civilian

¹⁴⁵Lowenthal, "Latin America: Ready for Partnership?" Foreign Affairs, Winter 1993, p. 74.

police force, and in strengthening fledgling political institutions. Inasmuch as there is no real U.S. security threat or economic interest in Haiti, the goal of the U.S.-led intervention is a democratic form of government. To attain such a goal, it is necessary to assist Haiti in rebuilding and development. Foreign aid is especially crucial in light of the devastation wrought by three years of sanctions. According to the Clinton Administration, support for democracy serves U.S. ideals and U.S. interests. A more democratic world is a world that is more peaceful and more stable. Thus, an American foreign policy of engagement for democracy must effectively address:

(1) Emerging Democracies: Help to lead an international effort to assist the emerging, and still fragile, democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union build democratic institutions in free market settings, demilitarize their societies and integrate their economies into the world trading system. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign assistance programs in Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America and elsewhere should be targeted at helping democracies rather than tyrants.

(2) Democracy Corps: Promote democratic institutions by creating a Democracy Corps to send American volunteers to countries that seek legal, financial, and political expertise to build democratic institutions, and support groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, the Asia Foundation, and others.

President Clinton, the first U.S. president to visit Haiti since Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, witnessed the March 31, 1995 turnover of the U.S.-led operation to a United Nations mission. The UNMIH includes troops from many nations and is to remain in Haiti until the February 1996 inauguration of a new Haitian president. Chart 1 describes the composition of the UNMIH.

Chart 1

UNMIH

MILITARY

United States - 2,400 engineering, aviation, logistics, special forces, light cavalry

Pakistan - 850 troops

Bangladesh - 850 troops

Canada - 475 engineering, aviation, logistics

Nepal - 410 troops

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) - 300 troops

Netherlands - 142 troops

Honduras - 120 troops

Guatemala - 120 military police

India - 120 troops

Suriname - 36 troops

Argentina - 27 troops

Headquarters Staff: 172 (all countries)

CIVILIAN POLICE: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, Dominica, France, Grenada, Guinea, Bissau, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Togo.¹⁴⁶

Haiti's proximity to the United States played a major role in the level of U.S. involvement. Traditionally, there has not been much U.S. intervention in troubled countries that are a long distance away from the United States. For instance, it is not likely that the United States will intervene, militarily, in Rwanda or other African and Asian nations, despite the atrocities in those countries. There were approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandans killed in just a few months of blatant genocide, compared with up to 3,000 Haitians killed during the

¹⁴⁶Reuter, "America On-Line," March 29, 1995, p. 1.

three years of Haitian military rule.¹⁴⁷ Although the United States is generally considered the sole remaining superpower, it does not have sufficient resources to respond fully to all worldwide crises. The U.S. focus is thus centered on troubled countries in close geographic proximity to the United States. The question often arises: Just what are the national interests of the United States, regarding its southern neighbors? Lowenthal points out that Latin America is significant for the United States in at least four areas:

(1) Economic: The region has become the fastest growing market for U.S. exports. Latin America bought more than \$65 billion of U.S. exports in 1992, more than Japan or Germany, and the rate of increase in U.S. exports to Latin America for the years 1991 and 1992 has been three times as great as that for all other regions. Latin America also remains the source of nearly 30 percent of U.S. petroleum imports, and several U.S. money center banks still make a significant share of their income in the region.

(2) Latin America's effect on major problems facing American society: The most dramatic example is narcotics. Site of the world's largest rain forests and as leading destroyers of them during the past few years, Latin American countries are also central actors on environmental issues.

(3) A prime arena (together with the former Soviet Union and the countries of eastern and central Europe) for the core U.S. values of democratic governance and free market economies: As both democracy and capitalism are severely challenged in the former communist countries, the worldwide appeal and credibility of these ideas may depend, importantly, on whether our nearest neighbors can make them work.

¹⁴⁷Fauriol, pp. 10-11.

(4) Emigration: Perhaps the most important, the burgeoning Latin American pressures for emigration, create additional links between the emigrants' countries and the United States, and enlarge the U.S. stake in the region's social, economic, and political conditions. Almost half of all legal immigrants to the United States came from Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1980s, together with more than half of the undocumented entrants. Some ten percent of the U.S. population today are Latin American immigrants or their descendants. Latinos are the fastest growing population group in the United States.¹⁴⁸

In addition, Lowenthal argues that the chance for positive U.S. policies to reinforce Latin American progress and thereby advance U.S. aims depend on revitalizing the U.S. economy. The United States cannot successfully implement the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or help build a wider hemispheric economic and democratic community if it does not at the same time rejuvenate its own decaying infrastructure, upgrade its technology, enhance the skills of its workforce, retrain displaced workers, and assist uncompetitive industries and their communities adjust to change. Throughout the western hemisphere, people are concerned about making democracy work – by connecting institutions to people and ensuring accountability.

The intervention in Haiti sends a clear message to would-be coup leaders (military or otherwise). It demonstrates that the United States, along with the majority of the hemisphere and the world, stand ready to protect democracy (i.e., multilateralism with a common political objective).

For those who play a pivotal role in formulating the broad goals of U.S. policy, like the National Security Council (NSC), led by Anthony Lake, the State Department under Warren

¹⁴⁸Lowenthal, p. 74.

Christopher, and President Clinton, it is important to have a strong, decisive foreign policy agenda. The challenge for such external actors is to support and assist a country's democratization efforts – establishing civilian control of the military, and building democratic institutions that endure, are honest, responsive, and legitimate. To that end, some recommendations are:

(a) Continue with events like the December 1994, Summit of the Americas.

At the Summit of the Americas, the leaders endorsed eight initiatives that strengthen legislative, judicial, and law enforcement bodies that protect citizens and uphold democracy. The strengthened democratic institutions will bolster the ability of the OAS to foster dialogue, support legislation and electoral reform, and improve the administration of justice. To combat corruption, an enemy of democratic governance, the summit leaders agreed to forge links between the OAS and the OECD in the fight against commercial bribery and to try to ensure better ties between law enforcement authorities. The leaders endorsed Venezuela's proposal for a hemispheric agreement to extradite and prosecute those engaged in corrupt practices.

(b) Encourage and allow not only Chile, but other countries to join NAFTA.

(c) Promote and protect democracy – peacefully and multilaterally – as attempting in Haiti.

(d) Assist with multilateral efforts to help train and reform Latin American militaries.

(e) Lift the Cuban embargo – why punish innocent people simply to punish Castro?

(f) Assist the Haitians in civil-military relations, particularly when it comes to gaining civilian control over the military. Continue assisting in the training of a viable civilian police force.

(g) Help in strengthening the political process, including the creation of such crucial factors as a viable political party system, an effective legislative branch, and a credible criminal justice system. These institutions need to be strengthened, improving their effectiveness, oversight, law-making, and responsiveness to citizen concerns.

(h) Support the electoral process, prior, during, and after the elections.

- (i) Assist companies that were forced to close by the embargo of Haiti, encourage the return of foreign companies, and attract new companies to Haiti.
- (j) Ensure the USAID Recovery Plan for Haiti is followed through, including the plans for rebuilding, recovery, and sustainable development:

USAID SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES "REBUILDING"

Create a civilian Interim Public Security Force (IPSF)
Demobilize and reintegrate armed forces
Make court and penal systems operational
Carry out elections
Create employment
Clear arrears
Provide balance of payments support
Support Government of Haiti democratization of public assets efforts
Continue humanitarian assistance

USAID MID TERM OBJECTIVES "RECOVERY"

Rebuild system of justice
Establish a permanent civilian police force
Strengthen local governance
Provide assistance in agriculture, environment, education, and micro-enterprise
Strengthen government of Haiti financial and technical institutions
Support presidential elections

USAID LONG TERM OBJECTIVE "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT"

Strengthen public sector institutions
Promote social reconciliation
Protect the environment¹⁴⁹

In addition, Robert Pastor presented seven proposals to facilitate the transition from dictatorship and the consolidation of democracy (many of which have come to pass):

¹⁴⁹Fauriol, pp. 183-184.

PASTOR'S 1989 PROPOSALS

- (1) NATIONAL COMMITTEES TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY: organizations to support the democratic process, much as human rights organizations defend individual rights.
 - (2) TRANSNATIONAL BONDS TO REINFORCE PLURALISM: A vigorous democracy needs independent organizations that reflect the interests and concerns of business, labor, the press, consumers, universities, churches, and the full range of specific interests in a country.
 - (3) AN INTERNATIONAL ELECTION-MONITORING ORGANIZATION: For democracies to be secure, elections need to be free and fair. When questions are raised about the fairness of elections, legitimacy and power diminishes and the government that takes office is flawed.
 - (4) GOVERNMENT POLICIES: A NEW BETANCOURT DOCTRINE: For international organizations to be established and effective, changes are necessary in each government's policies. All democracies routinely and rhetorically defend democracy, but few if any have specific policies for implementing that defense.
 - (5) MULTILATERALIZING THE BETANCOURT DOCTRINE (Democracy in the Inter-American system): This is similar to the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, where 34 of the 35 hemispheric country leaders met, to among other things, assess the state of democracy in the region and develop recommendations on ways to strengthen democracy where it exists and promote democracy where it is absent.
 - (6) GROUP OF DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS: Since the resurgence of democracies in the region, inaugurations of new presidents in the Americas have become occasions for presidents of Latin America to meet and discuss a range of contemporary issues.
 - (7) A COUNCIL OF DEMOCRATIC HEADS OF GOVERNMENT: Establishment of a council to ensure that the democratic openings of the 1980s not be lost. Provides assistance whenever a president determines that democracy in his country is threatened.
- IN SUMMARY, there is much that can be done by outside groups, institutions, and individuals to reinforce those democrats in the Americas who are determined to prevent the pendulum of democracy from swinging back toward dictatorship.¹⁵⁰

Pastor also added that "the United States should begin to focus its foreign policies on Latin American issues. The end of the Cold War, changes in Latin America, and the downturn in the U.S. economy are contributing to the need to change focus. Free trade between Latin

¹⁵⁰Robert Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1989), pp. 144-153.

America and the United States will allow the United States to compete more effectively internationally.”¹⁵¹

There are those who argue that democracy is not possible in Haiti. For instance, Ian Vasquez points out that U.S. efforts to strengthen democracy in Latin America by working through the OAS have not been successful and have often caused damage. U.S. policy should focus on free trade rather than crusading missions for democracy.¹⁵² According to Suzanne Gardinier, U.S. foreign policy is dominated by a small elite, whose policy options are not informed by a democratic consensus of the American people. Furthermore, Gardinier writes that

in this country [United States], a bewildered and vigorous debate is taking place over the direction “our” foreign policy should take, now that the comforting dualism of the Cold War has disappeared. The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, and the Ambassador to the United Nations, and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all elected by no one, confront unprecedented geopolitical dilemmas like those rooted in Haiti and Somalia and the former Yugoslavia with words like “enlargement,” “muscular multilateralism,” and “dual containment,” backed, as is our custom, by the threat of massive military force.¹⁵³

Strengthening democracy means first and foremost, bolstering the public and private institutions that defend human rights, engage citizens in the political process, and promote justice. For democracy to succeed and thrive, governments must be able to respond to citizens’ needs effectively, regularly, and fairly. Gardinier also made note of the March/April 1994 Foreign Affairs issue, where U.S. National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, summoned the new

¹⁵¹Pastor, “The Latin American Option,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1992), p. 107.

¹⁵²Vasquez, “Washington’s Dubious Crusade for Hemispheric Democracy,” USA Today Magazine (January 1995), p. 54.

¹⁵³Gardinier, “In Search of Democracy,” The Progressive (September 1994), p. 16.

but somehow familiar specter of what he called “backlash states” (Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya) which threaten “the family of nations now committed to the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict, and the promotion of collective security – thus, [U.S.] policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values.”¹⁵⁴

According to Lowenthal and Peter Hakim, “Internal problems have made it difficult for newly-democratic countries in Latin America to effect true democracy. Thus, Latin America needs combined assistance from the United States and its allies.”¹⁵⁵ The world is seemingly at another pivotal point in history. The collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger or threats to U.S. interests. However, it does pose an unprecedented opportunity to make the future more secure and prosperous. Once again, a compelling vision for global leadership at the dawn of a new era must be defined. The United States must be prepared to use military force decisively when necessary to defend its vital interests. The burdens of collective security in a new era must be shared fairly, and multilateral peacekeeping, through the United Nations and other international efforts, should be encouraged. The single most important recommendation is that U.S. foreign policy continue to fully support democratization and market reform throughout the world.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵Lowenthal and Hakim, “Democracy on Trial: Politics in Latin America,” Current (February 1992), p. 28.

VI. CONCLUSION

There are three possible conclusions that can be reached in this thesis, concerning the potential impact of the United States on the transition to democracy in Haiti: (a) U.S. support is a necessary and sufficient condition for democratization in Haiti, (b) U.S. support is necessary but not sufficient, and (c) U.S. support is not necessary or sufficient. The thesis supports the second explanation, concluding that the United States' support of democracy in Haiti is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing democracy in that country. The United States cannot compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings, but it can seek to affect the two most important internal factors for Haiti's democratization: civil-military relations and political institutions. U.S. support for democracy in Haiti will only succeed if the Haitian civilian government exercises control over the military, and if Haiti's political institutions are efficient and functioning properly.

A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In Haiti there have been past efforts to pursue democracy as a form of government. However, these democratization efforts have been unsuccessful, primarily due to the Haitian military's recurring role in politics. The ruling military junta, which had assumed power after the 1991 military coup, was finally ousted as a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts and the U.S.-led intervention in September 1994. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was returned, and democracy in Haiti is seemingly in transition.

The U.S.-led intervention and support provides the environment and opportunity for Haitians to lay foundations for democratization. The Haitian government, with the support of its citizens, must develop and maintain control over the military, and establish viable political institutions. Building institutions from the ground up will not be an easy task. However, with international

assistance, Haiti has made encouraging strides in its democratization efforts. For instance, despite allegations of irregularities, the internationally monitored elections held in June and September 1995, constitute a positive step in Haiti's effort to transition to democracy.

Democratization, in its broadest sense, involves the creation of institutions of civil and political society. The institutions of civil society are consensus-building mechanisms that allow people to participate in governmental decisions that affect their lives and hold in check the forces of tyranny. Democratization does not mean that every government in the world must emulate the U.S. experience – that is a narrow definition of democracy. However, it is essential for institution-building to occur in a manner that guarantees all people greater access to, and participation in, the political, economic, and social life of their nation.

The belief that the military has the right and the duty to change the government in order to protect their existence, achieve their goals, and protect and/or modernize the state has dominated the thinking of many Latin American military officers for decades. Latin American soldiers have traditionally been significant political actors, especially in Haiti. Thus, civilian control of the military is a requisite of any stable democracy.

President Aristide's 1991 attempt to control the military failed, but due to the opportunity provided by the 1994/1995 international coalition, Aristide has abolished the Haitian military. On the anniversary of Aristide's October 15, 1994 return to Haiti, that country is farther along in growth and democratic development than thought possible when Aristide resumed the presidency in 1994.

Although a great deal remains to be done in Haiti, having achieved the key objective, the Multi-National Force (MNF) reports a successful operation to date. The assistance provided by the MNF resulted in the departure of the military coup leaders, the restoration of Haiti's legitimate

government, and the establishment of a secure and stable environment. With this type of support and favorable conditions, the Haitians can now make greater strides in the effort to rebuild vital institutions such as the political party system, the legislature, and the judiciary. As reported to the Congress,

The Government of Haiti has been restored. With passage of essential laws, and the recent establishment of a Provisional Electoral Council, the Haitian people continue to take on more responsibility for their nation's future and are appreciative of the efforts of the international community on their behalf.¹⁵⁶

Can the future form of government in Haiti be predicted? This thesis argues, optimistically, for the prospects of Haitian democracy based on the analysis and research completed through September 1995. As long as the Haitian people: (a) are empowered by U.S. support and assistance, (b) gain control over the Haitian military, and (c) succeed in revamping political institutions, then a sustainable transition to democracy is possible. The overwhelming success of Operation Uphold Democracy, along with a seemingly genuine desire of the Republic of Haiti to democratize, leads to the conclusion that Haiti could be on the long road to democratic consolidation. In addition, international pressure and the lack of credible alternatives to democracy contribute to the future prospects of democracy in Haiti.

Democracy building is inherently a long-term process. The end results of the U.S.-led intervention in Haiti will not be completely discernible for some time yet. Although the political environment is stable, democratization in Haiti is not yet a fact. Instead, the more reasonable conclusion is that Haiti is in a transition of sorts, and time will reveal the future of this nation.

¹⁵⁶U.S. President, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," February 1, 1995, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, pp. 9, 10.

There are many hurdles that Haiti must still confront. The next six months, with the December presidential election, is very important to the future democratic development of the country. The fact that the international community is committed to giving Haiti a window of opportunity, to nurture democracy, lends credence to the idea of a democratic Haiti.

B. THE HAITIAN CASE: CAN IT BE GENERALIZED?

Based on the analysis, can one generalize from the Haitian case? The Haitian case can perhaps be generalized, especially for countries with a similar history of non-democratic rule, authoritarianism, and military domination. For instance, in terms of the need for U.S. assistance and support of democratic development, post-Castro Cuba might benefit from the Haitian case. Moreover, the Haitian case may have implications for states in other regions such as the newly independent Russian states and various African states.

Although most Latin Americans favor democracy as a form of government, the simple truth is that representative democracy is not being successfully consolidated in some of Latin America. Instead, what is often being entrenched is what has been called “democracy by default,” “delegative democracy,” or “low-intensity democracy.”¹⁵⁷ Governments that derive their initial mandate from popular election are tempted to govern “above” parties, legislatures, courts, interest groups, or the organizations of civil society. To the extent that they do, weak institutions are further undermined, accountability is thwarted, public cynicism and apathy grow, and legitimacy is eroded. This syndrome poses the danger, in several countries, of a slide toward renewed authoritarian rule, albeit

¹⁵⁷Lowenthal, “Latin America: Ready for Partnership” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1993), p. 74.

different from the anti-Communist military regimes of the 1970s.¹⁵⁸ Many authors argue that the weakness of democracy in Latin America is the result of a strong authoritarian heritage that has made the process of establishing an alternative political system difficult.¹⁵⁹

In addition, what of those Latin American countries where democracy may be vulnerable? There is some question as to the survivability of some third wave democracies, particularly those where democracy is relatively new, such as in Panama, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These countries lack the tradition of a democratic form of government. If these countries experience challenges to their democratic form of government, then the Haitian case can perhaps be useful. However, Haiti is unique in its turbulent political history and location, especially in terms of proximity to the United States and its position within the U.S. sphere of influence. Traditionally, the United States has not intervened, militarily, in the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) nor in countries like Nigeria or Liberia. With this fact in mind, the question of proximity to the United States becomes central.

Georges A. Fauriol writes that geographic proximity is of the utmost importance in the U.S. response to troubled countries. Despite the United States' status as the world's sole remaining superpower, it does not have sufficient resources or inclination to respond to crises throughout the world.¹⁶⁰ Instability in Latin America's Southern Cone does not affect vital U.S. security interests.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), p. 167.

¹⁶⁰Fauriol, ed., Haitian Frustration: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 11.

For instance, the immigration problem encountered during the Haitian crisis, would be virtually non-existent for the United States in Southern Cone crises.

Moreover, of the interviews conducted, none of the interviewees saw the Haitian case as generalizable. They were of the opinion that the Haitian case is unique and that where some aspects of the case may be generalizable, the Haitian case is for the most part unique. For instance, Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, USMC, is of the opinion that while the Haitian case is not generalizable, there are some areas like the rules of engagement, that can be applied to other countries.¹⁶¹ Each country and situation is unique, and while the United States can and should intervene, the operation will be necessarily different. Lieutenant Colonel Allan Thompson, Joint Chiefs of Staff-Western Hemisphere, points out the importance of proximity and U.S. sphere of influence. The mission in Haiti is easier to take on and accomplish, especially with Haiti being "in our backyard." Colonel Thompson identifies the Haitian model as a "model for interagency cooperation -- a benchmark for UN cooperation."¹⁶² However, overall he notes that the United States must lead the international arena on a state by state basis, and that individual countries will necessarily be treated differently, especially landlocked countries like those of Europe. The United States may not take the lead in countries that are not in the U.S. sphere of influence. Similarly, Mr. Doron Bard, Haiti Working Group, U.S. Department of State, points out that the United States has a special interest in Haiti, and that the U.S. action as witnessed in Haiti, will most likely not be seen elsewhere in places like Cuba.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹Colonel Boyatt Brief: Special Operations in Haiti, May 4, 1995.

¹⁶²Lieutenant Colonel Thompson Interview, Washington DC, May 9, 1995.

¹⁶³Mr. Bard Interview, Washington DC, May 9, 1995.

Democratization efforts in Panama are somewhat similar to the scenario in Haiti, in that comparable efforts are underway. USAID programs in Panama has reaped tremendous benefits in the five years since democracy was restored. The Electoral Tribunal, responsible for massive fraud in the 1988 elections, has been transformed into a highly respected public institution, carrying out free and fair elections. The judiciary has worked to make the justice system more accessible to people through the availability of public defenders. The military has been disbanded, and the National Police are better trained, under civilian control, and have a better understanding of the role of a police force in a democratic society.¹⁶⁴ While in Haiti, migration and human rights abuses have decreased, the June and September 1995 elections were peaceful, free of fraud, and gave voice to the political will of Haitians. Aristide chose to disband the military, and the newly trained civilian police force will assume responsibility for preserving law and order upon the scheduled departure of UNMIH troops in February 1996.

Haiti's democratic success rests primarily with the Haitians, and their ability to use to their advantage the circumstances created by the U.S.-led intervention. While the weight of history, culture, and the independent actions of the Haitians has the larger effect, continued U.S. support and assistance is also important for the democratization of Haiti.


In this hemisphere, the United States has the opportunity to build on accomplishments already initiated, and consolidate and enhance them in support of democratic societies and democratic institutions. The success of the mission in Haiti will test whether Latin America and the Caribbean will enter the next century with greater freedom for all of its citizens, with expanding opportunity, and with new hope. If the United States does not continue to take the lead, the

¹⁶⁴USAID, "Advancing Democracy," Internet, April 1995.


Americas could enter the new century plagued by instability, crisis, and failed democracies – threatening the national interest and security of the United States.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, some questions for future research include: at what point does U.S. support for democracy become counterproductive; what rationale will be used if intervention in post-Castro Cuba is deemed necessary; moreover, at what point does the United States go from being perceived as being a part of the solution to being a part of the problem?

¹⁶⁵USAID Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Internet, March 1994.

**ANNEX A:
DEMOCRACY IN HAITI: A CAUSAL MODEL**



ANNEX B:
Three Guesses: Who is Aristide?



*From a profile by Graham Fraser in Toronto's
centrist "Globe and Mail"*

HERO

Among his supporters, who still constitute the great mass of Haitians, the name of Jean-Bertrand Aristide evokes something close to awe—a breath-stopping look of hope and exaltation that is humbling in its sincerity and naked emotion.

*From an interview by Robert W. Sherman in the
liberal newsmagazine "Cambio 16" of Madrid*

TERRORIST

On failure to curb the violence: Aristide: "we will avoid such excesses; we will seek understanding." Robert Sherman: "As they did in January 1991, when your supporters burned hundreds of your political rivals alive, without your raising a finger to stop them?: Aristide: "The military's propaganda has magnified events that were never more than small incidents that got out of control. Unfortunately, violence begets violence, and we were not the ones who started it. I would like to say that we have learned our lesson, that we have paid a high price for the mistakes we may have committed because of our lack of experience."

*From an editorial in the liberal "La Jornada" of
Mexico City*

SELLOUT

During his long stay in the United States, Aristide lost the political image that carried him to power. . . while his plan then [1991] aimed at depriving the armed forces of the privileges they had taken over the years by fire and blood, Aristide now wants an improbable reconciliation between the executioners and their victims.

Annex B. From reference: World Press Review (December 1994), p. 13.

**ANNEX C:
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
BY ARISTIDE, SEPTEMBER 25, 1991**

FIRST:	Liberty or death.
SECOND:	Democracy or death.
THIRD:	Fidelity to human rights.
FOURTH:	The right to eat and to work.
FIFTH:	The right to demand what rightfully belongs to us.
SIXTH:	Legitimate defense of the diaspora, or tenth department.
SEVENTH:	No to violence, yes to <i>Lavalas</i> .
EIGHT:	Fidelity to the human being, the highest form of wealth.
NINTH:	Fidelity to our culture.
TENTH:	Everyone around the same table.

Annex C. From Aristide, Aristide: an Autobiography.

ANNEX D: MAJOR HAITIAN EVENTS

DATES	HAITI'S TURBULENT PAST: MAJOR EVENTS
MAY 1791	SLAVE REVOLUTION
JANUARY 1804	HAITI DECLARES ITS INDEPENDENCE
JUNE 1816	PÉTION DECLARED FIRST "PRESIDENT FOR LIFE"
1821-1844	HAITI INVADES SANTO DOMINGO, UNITES/RULES ENTIRE ISLAND
JUNE 1838	FRANCE RECOGNIZED AN INDEPENDENT HAITI
JUNE 1862	UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED AN INDEPENDENT HAITI
AUGUST 1912	NATIONAL PALACE BLOWN UP-PRESIDENT LECONTE et.al. KILLED
1908-1915	HAITI HAS 7 PRESIDENTS IN 7 YEARS-ON THE BRINK OF CIVIL WAR
JULY 1915	PRESIDENT SAM KILLED BY STREET MOB
JULY 1915	U.S. MARINES INVADE TO RESTORE ORDER, PROTECT INTERESTS
AUGUST 1934	END OF AMERICAN OCCUPATION
SEPTEMBER 1957	FRANCOIS "PAPA DOC" DUVALIER ELECTED PRESIDENT
APRIL 1964	PAPA DOC DECLARES HIMSELF "PRESIDENT FOR LIFE"
APRIL 1971	JEAN-CLAUDE "BABY DOC" DUVALIER BECOMES PRESIDENT
FEBRUARY 1986	BABY DOC EXILED TO FRANCE AMIDST POPULAR UPRISINGS
MARCH 1987	VOTERS APPROVE NEW CONSTITUTION
NOVEMBER 1987	VOTER-MASSACRE, ELECTION CALLED-OFF
JUNE 1988	COUP d'ETAT DEPOSED MANIGAT, INSTALLED GENERAL NAMPHY
SEPTEMBER 1988	COUP d'ETAT DEPOSED NAMPHY, INSTALLED GENERAL AVRIL
MARCH 1990	AVRIL STEPS DOWN AMID ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS
MARCH 1990	PASCAL-TROUILLOT-PRESIDENT OF CIVILIAN PROVISIONAL GOVT.
DECEMBER 1990	FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION - ARISTIDE WINS
SEPTEMBER 1991	COUP d'ETAT - ARISTIDE DEPOSED, EXILED TO UNITED STATES
JUNE 1993	UN IMPOSED WORLDWIDE OIL EMBARGO, FROZE ASSETS ABROAD
DECEMBER 1993	MILITARY JUNTA AGREES TO ACCORD BUT FAILS TO HONOR IT

DATES	HAITI'S TURBULENT PAST: MAJOR EVENTS
SEPTEMBER 1994	U.S. DIPLOMATIC DELEGATION AVERTS U.S. INVASION
SEPTEMBER 1994	OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, US-UN COALITION OF FORCES
OCTOBER 1994	ARISTIDE RESTORED AS HAITIAN PRESIDENT
JANUARY 1995	UN DECLARES A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN HAITI
MARCH 1995	US TRANSFER OPERATION TO UN MULTINATIONAL FORCE
JUNE 1995	PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HELD
SEPTEMBER 1995	RUN-OFF ELECTIONS HELD
DECEMBER 1995	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED

Annex D. From Bellegarde-Smith, The Breached Citadel; Howard French, "Haiti: 33 Harrowing Years," The New York Times, December 17, 1990, p. A3.

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